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The biopharmaceutical industry is characterized by the ‘cumulative innovation’ 
paradigm, wherein the discovery of a gene sequence is only the first step. In 
order to convert such sequence information into viable products, tests and cures 
for genetic conditions and diseases, vast amounts of additional time, effort and 
money have to be spent. It is feared that patents over upstream gene 
sequences may ‘block’ further downstream research and consequently adversely 
impact drug discovery, as many diseases today are known to have genetic 
origins.  
 
This ‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ issue has been the subject of several 
important papers and a wide array of solutions have been suggested. However 
not many authors have suggested looking to the ‘doctrine of essential facilities’ 
as a potential solution. This doctrine stipulates that in certain circumstances, a 
monopolist in control of an ‘essential facility’ (gene sequences) can be ordered 
to grant access to its facility to others who may then go on to identify useful 
products/services.  
 
Even amongst the few authors that have suggested an application of this 
doctrine, the treatment has been sparsenone of them have focussed on the 
most fundamental aspect of this doctrine, namely the concept of ‘essentiality’ or 
‘indispensability’. Consequently, this paper seeks to fill this gap by asking: ‘how 
essential is a patented gene?’ The paper will demonstrate that although it is 
difficult to invent around patented genes, it is not impossible-viable substitutes 
3do exist. To this extent, not all patented genes would quality as ‘essential’ for 
the purposes of the application of the essential facilities doctrine.  
 
The paper concludes by noting that an antitrust remedy cannot be a panacea to 
resolve the blocking or restricted access issue for all time to come. Rather, if the 
blocking issue becomes pervasive, it may be more prudent to devise a more 
focussed remedy.  
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The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step Lao Zi 
The biopharmaceutical1 industry is characterized by the ‘cumulative innovation’ 
paradigm, wherein the discovery of a gene2 sequence is only the first step. In 
order to convert such sequence information into viable products, tests and cures 
for genetic conditions and diseases, vast amounts of additional time, effort and 
money have to be spent.3 It is feared that patents over upstream gene 
sequences may ‘block’ further downstream research and consequently adversely 
impact drug discovery, as many diseases today are known to have genetic 
origins.  
 
1 A ‘biopharmaceutical’ is defined broadly as ‘any biology-based therapeutic that structurally 
mimics compounds found within the body’: PC Nagle, TF Lugo and CA Nicita ‘Defining and 
characterizing the late-stage biopharmaceutical pipeline’ (2003) 9 (6) Am J Management Care 
124. Biopharmaceuticals would therefore include recombinant proteins, monoclonal and 
polyclonal antibodies, peptides, antisense oligonucleotides, therapeutic genes, and certain 
therapeutic vaccines. However, in this paper, I use this term primarily in relation to ‘therapeutic 
genes’ and their resulting products.  
2 A gene refers to the ‘basic physical and functional unit of heredity that is transmitted from one 
generation to the next and can be transcribed into a polypeptide or protein’: D Suzuki and P 
Knudtson Genethics (Harvard Univ Press Harvard 1990) 343.  
3 Jean Lanjouw describes the cumulative nature of the innovation process thus: ‘The simplest 
model considers a two-staged research process, where the first stage is discovery and 
purification of a gene and the second stage is the development of a product based on that 
gene’: JO Lanjouw ‘A Discussion of “Of Patents and Genes: Flows of Knowledge and Intellectual 
Property Rights” by Claude Henry’ (paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics [World Bank] May 2003) 
<http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eurvp/web.nsf/Pages/Paper+by+Lanjouw/$File/LANJOUW.PDF
> (12 September 2004) 3. 
9My journey began as an earnest attempt to find an effective solution to the 
blocking impasse referred to above. Within a few miles of this endeavour, 
realisation struck that the journey was beset with multiple pathways and that 
not even one of them could be successfully traversed within the course of one 
paper. Caught at the crossroads of these daunting multiple pathways, I decided 
to plunge into what I thought would be the most promising pathway and 
ventured to take that single step.  
 
A THE JOURNEY BEGINS: AN EXPLANATION OF THE TITLE 
 
To begin with, an explanation of the title is in order. The phrase ‘Block Me Not’ 
is a play on the name of a highly sensitive plant, the ‘Touch Me Not’. Known 
scientifically as Mimosa Pudica, this plant, found mainly in some Pacific islands, 
shrinks and withdraws into itself upon any kind of touchhence the name. In 
much the same way as this plant, ‘gene patents’ are a highly sensitive issue and 
unless handled with appropriate delicacy, could have fatal ramifications for 
biomedical drug discovery. In this regard, it bears noting that this paper will 
focus largely on patents covering ‘therapeutic genes’the reason being that the 
cumulative structure of the biopharmaceutical industry is more pronounced in 
this context.4
The change from ‘touch’ to ‘block’ in the title is reflective of the ‘blocking’ 
problems inherent in the biopharmaceutical industry. It is important to clarify 
here that the term ‘blocking’ is used in a wide sense in this paper to include not 
only ‘blocking patents’,5 but also all instances where downstream research is 
4 With a therapeutic gene, the chances of a further downstream product materializing are 
greater. 
5 The term ‘blocking patents’ has a specific legal connotation in the United States, where it refers 
to ‘blocking’ in the context of dominant and subservient (dependent) patentsin order to 
move forward, the holder of the subservient patent requires a licence from the holder of the 
dominant patent, and vice versa. See RP Merges ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining 
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents’ (1994) 62 Tenn L Rev 75. 
10
blocked by patents on upstream inventions.6 A paper by Professor Walsh and 
others refers to this as the ‘restricted access’ issue.7 I will therefore, for the sake 
of convenience, refer to this phenomenon as the ‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ 
issue. 
This ‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ issue has been the subject of several 
important papers8 and a wide array of solutions have been suggested, ranging 
from remedies within patent law (e.g. compulsory licensing of the patent, a 
wider research exemption etc) to remedies in other legal disciplines such as 
competition law or antitrust law.9 Amongst the various solutions proposed, the 
doctrine of essential facilities under competition law is particularly attractive and 
merits some detailed consideration. At its very core, an optimal resolution of the 
‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ issue involves a balance between the granting of 
6 See OB Arewa ‘Blocking, Tackling and Holding: Boundaries, Marking and Strategic Business 
Uses of Intangibles’ (Working Paper No 4 Case Research Paper Series September 2004) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=586483> (2 November 2004) who uses this term to refer broadly to 
include ‘offensive and defensive strategic behaviors intended to block competitive technologies 
or competitors themselves, which may or may not have anything to do with the development of 
a commercial product based upon an intellectual property right such as a patent’. 
7 J Walsh, A Arora and W Cohen ‘Effects of Research Tool Patenting and Licensing on Biomedical 
Innovation’ in WM Cohen and SA Merrill (eds) Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy 
(National Academies Press Washington 2003) 287 (hereafter ‘Walsh et al’). 
8 Professor Merges has dealt with the ‘blocking’ issue in some of his papers. See Merges (n 5). 
See also RP Merges and RR Nelson ‘On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope’ 90 Columbia LR 
4 (1990) 839. However for a more specific reference to ‘blocking’ in the context of biotechnology 
or biopharmaceuticals, see ‘Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing 
Practices: Evidence and Policies’ (OECD Berlin 2002) 78 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf> (20 November 2004) (hereafter ‘OECD 
Report’). See also Walsh et al (n 7), the jurisdictional focus of which is the United States. For a 
greater focus on the UK position, see the Nuffield Council on Bioethics ‘The Ethics of Patenting 
DNA: A Discussion Paper’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics London) 
<http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/patentingdna/index.asp> (18 November 2004) (hereafter 
‘Nuffield Paper’). For an empirical study of these issues in the Australian context, see D Nicol and 
J Nielsen ‘Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis Of Issues Facing The 
Australian Industry’ (Occasional Paper No. 6 Centre for Law and Genetics 
2003)<http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/ipria/publications/workingpapers/BiotechReportFinal.pdf
> (5 November 2004) (hereafter ‘Nicol and Nielsen’). Similarly, for an empirical study in this 
regard in the German context, see J Straus, H Holzapfel and M Lindenmeir ‘Genetic Inventions 
and Patent Law’An Empirical Survey of Selected German R & D Institutions’ (Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich 2004) copy on file with 
author (hereafter ‘Straus et al’). 
9 The term ‘antitrust law’ is more specific to the US; Europe refers to this stream of law as 
‘competition law’. These terms will however be used interchangeably throughout this paper.  
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sufficient incentives to the upstream inventor, while at the same time ensuring 
that the patent rights granted are not broad enough to unduly block further 
downstream research.10 It would appear that a competition authority is 
particularly well placed for this task, given that it involves a significant amount 
of economic analysis. 
 
B THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
 
There is no standard definition for the term ‘essential facilities doctrine’. 
Advocate General (AG) Jacobs in Bronner, however, captures its essence thus:11 
[A] company which has a dominant position in the provision of 
facilities which are essential for the supply of goods or services on 
another market abuses its dominant position where, without objective 
justification, it refuses access to those facilities. Thus in certain cases 
a dominant undertaking must not merely refrain from anti-competitive 
action but must actively promote competition by allowing potential 
competitors access to the facilities which it has developed.  
 
Thus, for example, this doctrine would specify when a railroad must be made 
available on ‘reasonable’ terms to a rival rail company or a patented technology 
licensed to a competitor. In the specific context of a patented gene that blocks 
downstream research, a potential solution would lie in qualifying such gene as 
an ‘essential facility’, to which access has to be granted, in terms of licensing it 
10 See Merges and Nelson (n 8), Rai (n 8) and Walsh (n 7). See also JH Barton ‘Patents and 
Antitrust: A rethinking in the light of patent breadth and sequential innovation’ (1997) 65 
Antitrust LJ 44. 
11 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v Media Print GmBH [1998] ECR I-7791 (AG opinion) [34] 
(hereafter ‘Bronner (AG)’). The European courts are yet to make an explicit reference to the 
term ‘essential facilities doctrine’. A number of their decisions dealing with ‘refusals to deal’ by a 
dominant company capture the essence of this doctrine. I will therefore use the term ‘essential 
facilities doctrine’ as a label to refer broadly to the central theme underlying this range of 
‘refusal to deal’ decisions. See text to n 113. 
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on reasonable license terms to downstream researchers who could then go on 
to identify a useful product based on the gene. 
 
However not many authors have suggested looking to the doctrine of essential 
facilities as a potential solution. Even amongst the few that have done so, the 
treatment has been sparse.12 More specifically, none of them have focussed on 
the most fundamental aspect of this doctrine, namely the concept of 
‘essentiality’ or ‘indispensability’.13 Consequently, this paper seeks to fill this gap 
by asking: ‘how essential is a patented gene?’ In this sense, while the first part 
of the title (‘Block Me Not’) expresses the ‘blocking’ concern in general (the 1000 
mile journey), the latter half (‘Are patented genes essential facilities?’) is the 
more specific question that this paper seeks to address (the first step in this 
long and arduous journey).  
 
An important caveatthis paper does not offer a ready solution to the above 
conundrum of whether a patented gene is an essential facility (if at all it were 
possible to offer such a solution). It seeks a more modest role in attempting to 
map out a framework within which the above question can be answered on a 
case-by-case basis. Whilst working out the contours of this framework, I will 
cast some doubt on the oft-repeated view that it is impossible to ‘invent’ around 
a patented gene or to find a substitute for the same. 
 
C STRUCTURE OF PAPER 
 
In terms of the structure of this paper: 
12 See for example, Professor Westin who deals summarily with this doctrine: ‘This doctrine 
could extend to genetic patent owners by analogizing genetic information as essential to the 
practice of all products stemming from the use of the genetic sequence’: LB Westin ‘Genetic 
Patents: Gatekeeper To The Promised Cures’ (2002) 25 Thomas Jefferson L Rev 271, 293. 
13 In fact, even authors who seek to analyse the essential facilities doctrine in relation to 
intellectual property generally (and not with specific reference to patented genes) do not pay 
sufficient attention to the ‘essentiality’ or ‘indispensability’ limb. 
13
1. The first chapter introduces the ‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ issue, as 
thought to be prevalent in the biopharmaceutical arena (using the breast 
cancer gene (BRCA1 and 2) and the HIV gene (CCR5) controversies as 
specific examples). I will however caution that before we begin exploring 
remedies to this problem, we need to ask ourselves if there is any 
‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ issue in the first place.  
2. The second chapter engages in a brief comparative analysis of the 
primary antitrust remedy (the doctrine of essential facilities) in relation to 
the various internal remedies within patent law. This analysis merits some 
consideration owing to the fact that it seems counterintuitive to resort to 
competition law when supposedly good internal mechanisms lie within 
patent law to resolve this issue.  
 
3. The third chapter explores the contours of the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ 
as drawn out by the European Commission/Courts and its application to 
intellectual property. I will specifically focus on the concept of 
‘essentiality’ or ‘indispensability’ as elucidated in the various decisions and 
attempt to draw out a framework for assessing this limb.  
 
4. In the fourth chapter, I will apply this framework to gene patents in order 
to assess their ‘essentiality’. In particular, I will explore the viability of 
various alternatives to patented ‘genes’ and in the process cast doubt on 
the widely held assumption that patented genes cannot be invented 
around. 
 






The thrust of the above examination will be under European/UK competition 
law. However, in so far as the paper undertakes a substantial assessment of 
patent law concepts, the jurisdictional focus will be UK law. As one would 
appreciate, this stems from the lack of a pan European patent law, at least in 
the sense in which there is a pan-European competition law stemming from the 
European Community Treaty 1957 (Treaty of Rome).14 However even in the 
context of patents, where possible, I will attempt to derive a broad European 
position, drawing from instruments such as the European Patent Convention, 
1973 (hereafter ‘EPC’) and the Community Patent Convention, 1975 (hereafter 
‘CPC’). 
 
In the course of the discussion, other legal systems will be referenced, in 
particular, the law of the United States. The reason is simple enougha highly 
litigious culture combined with a technologically sophisticated economy ensures 
that high technology cases tend to rear their heads first in this jurisdiction 
before finding their way to the others. Consequently, the chapter dealing with 
the ‘essentiality’ of a patented gene will, to the extent that is necessary to draw 
a comparative analysis, discuss US case law as well.15 
CHAPTER II 
 
GENE PATENTS: THE ‘BLOCKING’ OR ‘RESTRICTED ACCESS’ 
ISSUE 
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. 
 
14 Hereafter ‘EC Treaty’. 
15 Chapter V. 
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As mentioned earlier, the prospect of downstream inventions being ‘blocked’ by 
broad upstream patents16 is not merely anecdotal but has some historical basis. 
In a path-breaking paper, Merges and Nelson demonstrated that, in a variety of 
industries, broad upstream patents hindered further development of the 
technology.17 Thus for example, in the field of incandescent lighting, Thomas 
Edison’s broad patent was used to shut down competitors with improvements.18 
A BLOCKING IN THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
The biopharmaceutical industry seems an ideal target for blocking problems to 
occur, given the fact that: 
 
i) Patents were granted at the initial stages of gene sequencing to DNA 
sequences, with no known function than their mere use as probes.19 
Quite apart from the fact that these grants were not viewed as ‘fair’ 
ones,20 inherent in these grants was the potential for blocking any 
16 Professor Rai uses the terms ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ to ‘identify the proximity (temporal 
and conceptual) of particular research to a particular end product’. She emphasizes however 
that these classifications are quite fluid. Thus, for example, ‘research identifying a gene linked to 
a disease might be quite “upstream” if the commercial goal is a drug therapy. By contrast, if the 
commercial goal is a diagnostic test, research identifying the gene might be relatively 
“downstream”’. See AK Rai ‘Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical industry: 
The Role of Patents and Antitrust’ (2001) 16 Berkeley Tech LJ 813, 816. 
17 Merges and Nelson (n 8).   
18 ‘More importantly for our purposes, the validation of Edison’s broad patent slowed down the 
pace of improvements considerably’. ibid 886. 
19 S Basheer ‘Patenting Genes And Gene Sequences: The Next El Dorado’ Electronic Database of 
Intellectual Property (EDIP) Oxford (2002) 16 <users.ox.ac.uk/~edip/student_index.htm> (17 
December 2004) 16.     
20 Professor Lanjouw states: ‘One theme that runs through commentary on gene patents is a 
view that the “deal” in this case is not fair – that the rewards being reaped by those obtaining 
gene patents greatly exceed the amount they have invested’: Lanjouw (n 3) 6. There is a 
tendency to treat the ‘blocking’ issue in tandem with the ‘fairness’ issue. The immediate focus of 
this paper however will be on remedying a ‘blocking’ situation, without delving into the issue of 
whether the patents that block are ‘fair’ ones or not. It may be the case that the ‘fairness’ or 
‘unfairness’ could influence the outcome while applying the competition law remedy that is 
advocated in this paperhowever time and space constraints compel me to omit that 
discussion. 
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further research using these patented sequences. To appreciate the 
magnitude of this issue, consider the fact that the total number of 
patents on genes and genetic material granted by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) alone (up until the year 2002) 
was estimated to be around 8000of which about 1500 covered 
human genetic material.21 Similarly, in the year 2000, about 605 
patent applications pertaining to human or animal DNA sequences 
were filed at the European Patent Office (EPO).22 
ii) Genes are finite in number.23 Also, when compared with other 
inventions, it is extremely difficult to invent around patented genes or 
to find substitutes for the same.24 Because of these factors, gene 
patents grant real monopolistic power in a market already fraught 
with inefficiencies.25 
iii) A single gene may have more than one function. For example, 
mutations in the RET (Rearranged during Transfection) gene are 
responsible for two different disorders, Multiple Endocrine Neoplasia, 
21 L Rivers (2002) Statement of Representative Lynn Rivers on the Introduction of the Genomic 
Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002, and the Genomic Research and Diagnostic 
Accessibility Act of 2002 to the US House of Representatives 
<http://www.house.gov/science_democrats/member/lr031402.htm> (14 December 2004). See 
also OECD Report (n 8) 34. 
22 OECD Report (n 8) 8.
23 During the early 1990’s, when the patenting frenzy was beginning to catch on, it was thought 
that the human genome contained about 80,000 to 90,000 genes; recent research has however 
slashed this figure down to a mere 20,000 to 25,000 genes. See A Coghlan ‘Recount slashes 
number of human genes’ <http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99996561> (26 
December 2004). To this extent, it is important to note that this science is a relatively nascent 
and uncertain one.  
24 See Matthijs (n 175) 1359 and LB Andrews (n 55) 78-79. See also LB Westin (n 12) 297 who 
states ‘However, unlike industry standards patents, whose technology may be performed in 
other ways, there is no substitute for the use of genes or genetic material when developing new 
drugs, therapies and diagnostic tools that are based on the genetic information’. 
25 Statement of JF Merz ‘Oversight Hearing on Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions’ The 
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property (US House of Representatives 13 July 2000) 
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/merz0713.htm> (5 October 2004).  
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which includes thyroid cancer and Hirschsprung disease, a disorder of 
the intestinal tract.  A single patent over the sequence would give the 
patent holder potential control over two very different disorders.26 
Most patent regimes stipulate that a patent over a novel product 
entitles the patentee to not only the use identified in the patent 
application but to all its uses, even those that that may be discovered 
in future by third parties.27 
Multiple patents over such gene sequences could also result in what Heller and 
Eisenberg refer to as the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’a situation where there 
are numerous property right claims over the building blocks necessary for 
research and development.28 If property rights over such building blocks are 
held by multiple owners, the negotiations necessary to bring these blocks 
together can fail, thus stifling follow-on innovations. In contrast to this prospect 
of an anti-commons, the ‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ issue is not a problem of 
accessing multiple patents but one of accessing relatively few patents—or 
perhaps even one patent on a key upstream invention.29 Needless to state, the 
focus of this paper will be on the ‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ issue.  
 
26 WR Cornish et al ‘Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Genetics: A Study into the Impact 
and Management of Intellectual Property Rights within the Healthcare Sector’ (Public Health 
Genetics Unit (PHGU) Cambridge 2003) 33  <www.phgu.org.uk> (10 September 2004). 
27 As the Nuffield Paper (n 8) 65 rightly notes: While it may be thought that the inventor’s 
contribution does not deserve a monopoly over the compound per se, which covers all uses, the 
law provides for this because the inventor has provided the compound itself for others to work 
on.  
28 MA Heller and RS Eisenberg ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research’ (1998) 280 Science 698.   
29 Interestingly, in a later paper, co-authored with Professor Rai, Professor Eisenberg states: ‘It 
bears mention that the problems of unduly broad patent scope and proliferation of patent rights 
held by multiple owners can occur simultaneously. An initial broad patent on a pioneering 
research discovery doesn't necessarily preclude a proliferation of upstream patents related to 
that discovery. To the contrary, follow-on improvers often seek and obtain patent rights within 
the scope of the claims of the initial broad patent’: RS Eisenberg and AK Rai ‘The Public Domain: 
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’ (2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 
289.  
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Illustratively, two of the most controversial gene patents that have raised 
concerns of blocking in a stark manner and therefore deserve discussion are 
patents covering the CCR5 gene and the BRCA genes.   
 
1 CCR5 Patent 
 
In 2000, the USPTO granted a patent to Human Genome Sciences Inc (HGS) 
covering the gene sequence of the CCR5 receptor.30 This receptor is a protein31 
that plays a central role in the mechanism by which human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) binds to and enters white blood cells, and therefore represents a key 
target in the search for effective novel treatments for HIV infection and AIDS.32 
However, in the HGS patent application, a utility in HIV research was not 
mentioned.33 Rather, the utility of the invention was defined, among other 
things, as a tool for screening for receptor agonists and antagonists, and as a 
diagnostic tool for detecting mutations in the gene itself.34 
Other researchers, such as Professor Marc Parmentier, subsequently discovered 
that the CCR5 receptor was the ‘docking receptor’ used by the HIV virus to 
30 US Patent No. 6,025,154 (2000). 
31 A protein is a molecule composed of interacting polypeptides (chains of three or more amino 
acids joined together) that are folded or twisted into characteristic shapes. Proteins serve 
essential functions in the human body. Illustratively, they regulate metabolism (enzymes), make 
up skin, bones, and ligaments (keratin and collagen), produce movements (muscle proteins),  
transport oxygen (haemoglobin) and regulate movement into and out of cells (membrane 
proteins). See Hutchinson Dictionary Of Science (Brockhampton Press Ltd 1997) 265. 
32 NL Michael et al ‘The Role of CCR5 and CCR2 Polymorphisms in HIV-1 Transmission and 
Disease Progression’ (1997) 3 Nature Medicine 1160. 
33 E Marshall ‘Patent On HIV Receptor Provokes An Outcry’ (2000) 287 Science 1375. 
34 HGS filed its patent application for the CCR5 gene as a so-called ‘homologous sequence’ i.e. a 
gene sequence of unknown utility whose biological function could be predicted because it was 
similar to a separate sequence whose function had already been identified. This process of 
identification was fairly routine in the industry. See D Dickson ‘NIH Opposes Plans for Patenting 
‘Similar’ Gene Sequences’ (2000) 405 Nature 3. See also M Enserink ‘Patent Office May Raise the 
Bar on Gene Claims’ (2000) 287 Science 1196, 1197. 
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infect a cell.35 HGS’s patent meant that such researchers could be excluded or 
‘blocked’ from using the CCR5 gene in their research. Fortunately however, this 
prospect of ‘blocking’ never fructified, owing in large part to HGS’s immediate 
commitment to license the CCR5 patent on reasonable terms.36 The main reason 
underlying this commitment appears to be the fact that the public decried the 
grant of this patent when the utility cited by HGS was highly speculative and 
HGS had no idea of the nexus between the CCR5 receptor and HIV infection.   
 
2 BRCA Patents 
 
In another controversial case, Myriad Genetics (a US corporation) was accused 
of stifling research by demanding excessive royalties in respect of its patents 
covering the breast cancer genes, BRCA1 and 2.37 It was feared that Myriad’s 
actions would prevent the emergence of new and improved tests for diagnosing 
breast cancer.38 This fear became even more real when researchers at the 
Institut Curie, a French research institute used one of their technologies, called 
‘combed DNA colour bar coding’ to identify a mutation in BRCA1 in a patient 
who had received a negative result (no mutations detected) when tested by 
Myriad.39 This indicated that Myriad’s tests were far from perfect and that their 
35 A patent was recently granted in this regard to ‘Euroscreen’, a Belgian company, of which 
Parmentier is the founder. See ‘Euroscreen awarded US patent covering key HIV target’ Patent 
Café International (12 September 2002) 
<http://www.cafezine.com/index_article.asp?deptId=6&id=619&page=1> (4 October 2004). 
36 Marshall (n 33). 
37 Myriad currently holds approximately twenty patents worldwide covering the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes, certain mutations of the genes and tests to detect mutations in these genes. See 
J Paradise ‘European Opposition To Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing And 
The Inherent Implications For US Patent Law And Public Policy: A Case Study Of The Myriad 
Genetics' BRCA Patent Controversy’ (2004) 59 (1) Food and Drug LJ 133, 136.  
38 Myriad’s screening method aims to detect mutations in the breast cancer genes. Such 
mutations are thought to render a person more susceptible to breast cancer. See SJR Bostyn 
‘The Prodigal Son: The Relationship between Patent Law and Health Care’ (2003) 11(1) Medical 
LR 67, 106.   
39 BW Jones ‘History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of commercial 
BRCA Testing’ (2002) 10 Health LJ 123, 139. 
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approach to testing (which involved full DNA sequencing of the two BRCA 
genes) could only detect small-scale deletions and re-arrangements. Myriad’s 
patents however ensured that it could stunt the emergence of any such tests.40 
Here again, as with the CCR5 experience, a variety of factors ensured that the 
‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ threat was mitigated. For one, with the recent 
grant of a European patent covering the BRCA 2 gene to an English charity 
(Cancer Research (UK)), the impact of Myriad’s monopoly over the breast cancer 
genes stand diminished.41 This charity has committed to granting royalty free 
licences to public laboratories throughout Europe.  
 
More recently, following an opposition hearing launched by several European 
scientific institutes, one of Myriad’s patents over the BRCA1 gene was 
invalidated by the European Patent Office (hereafter EPO) on grounds of lack of 
novelty.42 This development reduces the impact of Myriad’s monopoly even 
further. 
 
B ‘WALSH ET AL’ PAPER AND ‘WORKING SOLUTIONS’ 
 
The fact that ‘blocking’ concerns in the above cases were mitigated to some 
extent (by external circumstances, or as was the case with CCR5, the parties’ 
40 The lab of a geneticist at the University of Pennsylvania, Arupa Ganguly, was stopped from 
testing, despite the fact that the tests were believed to be more accurate and cheaper than that 
of Myriad and the fact that some of the testing was done for research purposes. See J Borger 
‘Rush to Patent Genes Stalls Cures for Disease’ 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3941983,00.html> (26 December 2004). 
41 The patent covers all attempts to sequence the gene or to test for damaged and inactive 
variants. See S Mayor ‘Charity Wins BRCA2 Patent: Genetics Researchers Welcome a Decision 
That Will Make the Gene Freely Available in Europe’ 
<http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040213/02> (28 September 2004). 
42 The patent covered methods to predict a woman’s predisposition to develop breast or ovarian 
cancer by looking at certain mutations in the BRCA1 gene. See S Bodoni ‘EPO Revokes Myriad 
Cancer Test Patent’ Managing Intellectual Property (MIP) <http://www.legalmediagroup.com> 
(6 December 2004). 
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own conduct) does lead one to speculate that is some disconnect between the 
perceived fears of blocking and their actual translation into practice. This was 
the central theme of a recent paper by Professor John Walsh and others,43 
where they demonstrated that the theoretical possibility of ‘blocking’ concerns 
echoed by many scholars may have been offset by certain ‘working solutions’ 
adopted by the industry.  
 
These ‘working solutions’ include the taking of licences, inventing around 
patents, infringement (often informally invoking a research exemption), going 
offshore, developing and using public tools, and challenging patents in court.44 
The conclusions of the Walsh et al paper were broadly reflected in an OECD 
report as well which stated: 
 
The few examples used to illustrate theoretical economic and legal 
concerns related to the potential for the over-fragmentation of 
patent rights, blocking patents, uncertainty due to dependency and 
abusive monopoly positions appear anecdotal and are not supported 
by existing economic studies.45 
This forces us to revisit an assumption that this paper is based upon: Is there a 
‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’ concern in the first place? Surely, if there is none, 
we do not need to look for remedies or ways of tackling it.   
43 Walsh et al (n 7). This paper dealt with whether the prospect of an ‘anticommons’ as feared 
by Heller and Eisenberg had been realized and also whether the restrictions on access to 
upstream discoveries impeded biomedical innovation. As noted earlier, the ‘anticommons issue’ 
is quite distinct from the ‘blocking’ or the ‘restricted access’ issue and my focus will be on the 
latter. 
44 ibid 286. 
45 OECD Report (n 8). This report stemmed out of a workshop (held by the OECD Working Party 
on Biotechnology on 24-25 January 2002), in which several experts, including Dr Straus and Dr 
Walsh presented their findings. 
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It is important to note here that Walsh et al cautioned that notwithstanding the 
‘working solutions’ referred to by them, access tended to be an issue when a 
research tool was ‘rival-in-use’ and was potentially key to progress in one or 
more broad therapeutic areas. 46 They cited the example of a patent over 
human embryonic stem cell technology owned by the Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation’s (WARF) and exclusively licensed to Geron, a private 
biotechnology firm, to demonstrate how restrictions on access to an important, 
broadly useful technology could potentially retard its development.47 
The scope of the patent, the fact that the patent was a ‘pioneer’ patent, and the 
federal funding limitations laid down by the Bush Administration greatly 
increased the fear that such ‘exclusive licenses on research tools with potentially 
broad applications threaten to throttle scientific progress by limiting the number 
of players in a developing field.’48 
In order to prevent Geron from expanding its rights to include an additional 12 
tissue types and in order to be able to offer licensing rights to Geron’s 
competitors, WARF went to court in August 2001. This suit was settled in 
January 2002, with the settlement effectively narrowing Geron’s exclusive 
commercial rights to the development of only three types of cellsneural, heart, 
and pancreatic. Geron and WARF also agreed to grant royalty free licences to 
46 Walsh et al (n 7) 333. See also JP Walsh, A Arora and WM Cohen ‘Working through the Patent 
Problem’ (2003) 299 Science 1021.   
47 Owing to a moratorium on federal funding for research on human embryonic stem cells, 
research by the University of Wisconsin on human stem cells that finally led up to the patent 
(covering primate embryonic stem cell lines) was funded by Geron and not by the Federal 
Government. Geron agreed to provide funding in exchange for exclusive rights to develop 
human stem cells into six tissue types that might be used to treat disease as well as options to 
acquire the exclusive rights to others. See Walsh et al (n 7) 308. 
48 Eisenberg and Rai (n 29) 301. 
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academic and government scientists to use the stem cell patents for purely 
‘research’ purposes. 
 
Despite this settlement, the fact that Geron still retained control over key 
application areas of the technology49 was cause for concernthere were 
indications that it wished to pursue those applications itself to the exclusion of 
others.50 Similarly, although it agreed to freely license the stem cell patent rights 
for research-only uses, there still remained the possibility of stifling 
innovationas some researchers would not have wanted to embark upon 
research that could not, at a later stage, be effectively commercialised by them.  
 
Walsh et al therefore warned that there could be ‘future problems resulting from 
patents currently under review, court decisions, new shifts in technology, or 
even assertions of patents on foundational discoveries’ and anticipated ‘a 
continuing need for the active defense of open science.’51 
Notwithstanding the paper itself cautioning that its findings may not hold true 
for all time to come, some of the findings in the paper have met with 
skepticism. In relation to the ‘working solution’ that was premised on private 
firms simply ignoring research tool patents and hoping that difficulties in 
detecting infringement would fend off law suits,52 Professors Rai and Eisenberg 
rightly note:  
 
49 CR Carroll ‘Selling the Stem Cell: The Licensing of the Stem Cell Patent and Possible Antitrust 
Consequences’ (2002) U Illinois J L Technology and Policy 435, 44748.  
50 This is made evident by the statement of David Greenwood (CFO and senior VP of Geron), 
who noted that Geron did not have to allow others to develop products in the three areas where 
it retained exclusive rights. See Walsh et al (n 7) 309. 
51 Walsh et al (n 7) 335. 
52 See n 44. See also Walsh et al (n 7) 324-28. 
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Although the study characterizes this firm behaviour as a ‘working 
solution’, one might question the long-term viability of a solution that 
is based on pervasive law-breaking that may yet trigger costly 
litigation when it comes to light.53 
One cannot therefore expect the repertoire of ‘working solutions’ to provide a 
lasting solution to the blocking or ‘restricted access’ concern. The proliferation of 
incidents such as those involving Myriad and Geron could inflict significant social 
costs. The licensing practices of the owners of patents for other genetic 
testsfor example, Athena’s Alzheimer’s (ApoE) test, and the test owned by 
Miami Children’s Hospital for Canavan’s diseasehave also raised concern about 
high costs and limited access to genetic tests.54 One needs therefore to think of 
effective solutions to redress the blocking impasse. 
 
C PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR THE BLOCKING IMPASSE 
 
A variety of solutions, mostly centred around patent law, have been proposed to 
tackle the blocking issue.55 Some recommend a more effective use of existing 
patent doctrine while others insist on patent law reform. A few of these 
proposals are: 
 
53 Eisenberg and Rai (n 29) 318. 
54 A 1999 survey of the licensing practices of holders of patents that covered the diagnosis of 
genetic disorders showed that almost all the patents were being licensed exclusively. See 
Schissel et al ‘Survey Confirms Fears about Licensing of Genetic Tests’ Nature (1999) 402 
November 118. The OECD report also cautions that ‘empirical studies have shown problems 
arising over access to diagnostic genetic tests, although the exact cause of these problems has 
not been fully elucidated’. See OECD Report (n 8) 77. 
55 See LB Andrews ‘The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health 
Needs’, (2002) Houston J Health L & Policy 65, 66-67. 
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i) Prohibiting gene patents altogether.56 
ii) Ensuring that the patent monopoly on a gene sequence is limited to 
the specific function disclosed and not to all functions.57 
iii) Automatically subjecting all gene patents to compulsory licences.58 
Some others have sought to redress these issues outside the confines of patent 
law, such as the application of competition law,59 or even price regulation. 
Illustratively, Professor Bostyn proposes that ‘[i]f DNA patents lead to excessive 
prices of health care, then governments should take price measures instead of 
prohibiting patentability of DNA sequences’.60 
Of all the proposed solutions, the essential facilities doctrine within competition 
law appears the most promising and will consequently be the focus of this 
paper. Given time and space constraints, a comparative analysis of all the 
solutions proposed is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in so far as 
potential remedies exist within patent law to address the blocking impasse, I will 
attempt to demonstrate why these would be seen as deficient, when compared 
with an application of the essential facilities doctrine. 
56 Dr Carvahallo argues that the solution to problems posed by gene patents does not lie in 
diminishing patent rights, but rather in accepting that genes are non-patentable subject matter. 
See NP Carvalho ‘The Problem of Gene Patents’ (2004) 3 Washington U Global Stud L Rev 701, 
702.  
57 See Nuffield Paper (n 8) 87. See also FM Scherer ‘The Economics of Human Gene Patents’ 
(2002) 77 Academic Medicine 1348. In fact, a biotechnology amendment approved on 3 
December 2004 by Germany's Bundestag (lower house of Parliament) limits patent protection on 
human gene sequences to "disclosed functions" at the time of the patent application i.e a patent 
on a human DNA sequence used for a specific function would not cover a second function 
discovered later by another researcher using the same DNA sequence. See N Stafford ‘German 
Biopatent Law Passed’  <http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20041209/01> (24 December 
2004). 
58 See DM Gitter ‘International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United 
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use 
Exemption’ (2003) 76 New York L Rev 1623.  
59 See Westin (n 12) 297 who recommends the application of the ‘essential facilities doctrine’.  




PATENT LAW REMEDIES VERSUS COMPETITION LAW REMEDY 
 
Mirror, Mirror, on the wall, 
Who's the fairest one of all? 61 
As mentioned in the last chapter, it is not my intention to do a comparative 
analysis of all the solutions proposed to remedy the ‘blocking’ impasse. Rather, 
my more limited quest will be in attempting to satisfy those guardians of patent 
law who are likely to query: ‘Why turn to competition law at all? Are not 
remedies within patent law (hereafter ‘internal remedies’) adequate to resolve 
the blocking or ‘restricted access’ issue?’  
 
I will strive to demonstrate in this chapter that the ‘internal remedies’ are not 
sufficient to cater to the ‘blocking’ dilemma. However prior to addressing this, 
another broader and more general issue arises: Does the existence of remedies 
within patent law pre-empt the application of competition law in the first place? 
Here again, the immediate answer is ‘no’I elaborate as below:   
A PRE-EMPTION OF COMPETITION LAW? 
 
In order to restore competition in the market, it would appear that under EC 
competition law, a competition authority has overarching powers to interfere, 
even where there is sector-specific legislation. In Deutsche Telekom,62 the court 
61 Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs Translated and Illustrated by W Gag (Coward-McCann New 
York 1938) 10.  
62 Commission Decision No. 2003/707/EC Deutsche Telekom AG OJ L 263 (14 October 2003) 9, 
17. 
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endorsed previous rulings63 that consistently held that competition rules would 
apply where the sector-specific legislation does not preclude the undertakings it 
governs from engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents, restricts or 
distorts competition.  
 
Although intellectual property legislation is not on the same footing as 
telecommunications regulation or other sector specific legislation, the above 
logic could be transposed to intellectual property legislation as well. On the 
narrow principle postulated above, it is clear that since patent legislations confer 
sufficient autonomy on patentees to engage in conduct that could qualify as 
anticompetitive (attested to by a long line of cases involving anticompetitive 
conduct by patent holders), a competition authority has jurisdictional 
competence to intervene, despite the existence of patent legislation.  
 
1 Microsoft Decision 
 
The above does not squarely answer the more specific issue of whether a 
competition authority ought to intervene when the ‘internal’ remedies within 
patent law are adequate. Perhaps some guidance may be had from the recent 
Microsoft case, which touches peripherally on this issue.64 The Commission had 
in this decision ordered Microsoft to supply interface information relating to its 
servers to other server (operating-system) vendors.  
 
63 Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing [1997] ECR I-6225 [34]; Irish Sugar v Commission 
[1999] ECR II-296 [130]; Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali [2000] ECR II-1807 
[59]. The approach in the US is best reflected in a recent case where the Supreme Court 
concluded that unless there was a plain repugnancy—a clear clash between the intent of a 
sector-specific statute and antitrust law, they would not assume that a regulatory statute 
implicitly repeals the antitrust law.’ See Verizon Communications Inc v Curtis V Trinko LLP 540 
US 682 (2004) (hereafter ‘Trinko’).  
64 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37 792 Microsoft) C (2004) 900 final. 
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In response to Microsoft’s argument that such an order would upset the careful 
balance between copyright and competition policies struck by the Software 
Directive, the Commission stated categorically that ‘it is important to first note 
that the law applied in this case is Article 82 of the Treaty and not the Software 
Directive’.65 This statement, in and of itself, seems to suggest that an application 
of competition law would be independent of the existence of other legislations.66 
The Commission went on to point out that the Software Directive, being 
secondary Community legislation, could not, in any event, supersede Article 
82.67 This however begs the question: What if the Software Directive was not 
merely a Directive but was part of the EC Treaty, much like EC competition 
norms?  
 
Most intellectual property norms considered by the Commission or the European 
courts, to date, have stemmed from either national legislation or EU 
Directivesclearly these would be subservient to competition rules found in the 
EC Treaty itself.68 Therefore at this stage, the only serious limitation on a 
competition authority’s power to intervene appears to be the presence of 
65 ibid [744]. 
66 This takes us back to the more general issue of the relationship between intellectual property 
and competition law. However, I will deal with this issue only to the limited extent of addressing 
the key theme in this paperwould a patented gene qualify as an essential facility?  
67 Microsoft (n 64) [744]. The Commission further went on to state that the subservience of the 
Directive is also made evident by the fact that Recital 27 of the Directive states that the 
provisions of the Directive are ‘….without prejudice to the application of the competition rules 
under Articles 85 [now 81] and 86 [now 82] of the Treaty if a dominant supplier refuses to make 
information available which is necessary for interoperability as defined in [the] Directive’. ibid 
[748]. 
68 It bears noting at this juncture that there is no pan-European intellectual property legislation 
in the same way that the EC Treaty carves out competition law principles (see text to n14). 
However there is considerable harmonization between national intellectual property regimes as a 
result of European legal instruments (mainly Directives). Thus, when faced with what seems like 
a pre-emption claim, the Commission often stresses the supremacy of EC competition law. For 
example, in the recent IMS case, when considering the impact of the Database Directive, the 
Commission noted in pertinent part that ‘…the application of a Treaty article takes precedence 
over a Directive…’ See Commission Decision 2002/165 in Case COMP D3/38 044 NDC 
Health/IMS Health: Interim measures [2002] OJ L59/18 (hereafter ‘IMS I’). [205]. 
30
international treaties such as TRIPS69 or the Berne Convention70. The Berne 
Convention was called into question in Magillthe European Court of Justice 
(hereafter ‘ECJ’) however sidestepped the issue by ruling that the European 
Community was not a party to Berne.71 
The Commission in Microsoft then interestingly seemed to suggest that one of 
the internal remedies within the Directive to promote inter-operability (the 
‘decompilation’ defence) was ‘passive’ and was not sufficient to ensure 
competitiveness in this context. According to the Commission, its decision to 
mandate Microsoft to actively supply interface information to other server 
(operating-system) vendors, while being consistent with the Software Directive 
(as regards the balancing of intellectual property rights and interoperability), 
endorses a disclosure obligation under Article 82 of the Treaty which goes 
beyond ‘mere passivity in the face of de-compilation of its software code for 
interoperability purposes’.72 
The Commission’s decision to order disclosure under competition policy appears 
therefore to be based to some extent upon the inadequacy of ‘internal remedies’ 
to cater appropriately to the problem of access by Sun and other competitors of 
Microsoft. Had the remedy within the Directive been ‘adequate’, this may have 
been enough to dispose of the issue, since the ‘facility’ (Microsoft’s code) would 
not then have been treated as an ‘essential’ one by the Commission. Even on 
the facts as they stand, this decision has been severely criticized as not adhering 
to the traditionally strict parameters of ‘essentiality’ spelt out in Magill and 
IMSaspects that will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter. A 
69 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-
1C/IP/1 (hereafter ‘TRIPS’). 
70 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 (Paris Act 24 July  
1971) (hereafter ‘Berne Convention’). 
71 Joined Cases C 241 & 242/91 P RTE and ITP v. European Commission [1995] ECR I-743, 
[1995] 4 CMLR 718 [83] (hereafter ‘Magill’).  
72 Microsoft (n 64) [747]. 
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commentator goes to the extent of claiming that the decision seems to have 
evolved a concept of ‘convenient facilities’ as opposed to ‘essential facilities’. He 
states in pertinent part:  
 
By requiring compulsory access to a facility without which it is 
inconvenient (rather then essential) for rivals to do business, the 
Commission has in effect declared an ability to micromanage 
competition in a way that goes well beyond the ‘last resort’ 
intervention that normally characterises compulsory access cases.73 
In this context, it needs to be noted that even in the absence of a general pre-
emption doctrine, the existence of patent law remedies could nonetheless 
influence the outcome in a competition proceeding. Thus for example, the fact 
that a patent legislation specifies that patents could be 'compulsorily' licensed to 
remedy a ‘blocking’ situation ought to mean that the ‘facility’ itself is not an 
'essential' one for the purposes of the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine. One needs therefore to investigate whether any of the existing patent 
law remedies are adequate enough to remedy a ‘blocking’ situation.  
 
B REMEDIES WITHIN PATENT LAW 
 
Amongst the various solutions within patent law that can potentially redress the 
blocking issue,74 some of the most pertinent are: 
 
73 D Ridyard ‘Compulsory Access under EC Competition LawA New Doctrine of "Convenient 
Facilities" and the Case for Price Regulation’ (2004) 25(11) ECLR 669.  
74 Some scholars have recommended patent law reform as a panacea to the ‘blocking’ problem. 
Some of the proposals include barring gene patents altogether, ensuring that rights be granted 
only with respect to specific functions identified and subjecting all gene patents automatically to 
compulsory licences. See n 56-58. However since the focus of this paper is the use of existing 
law/legal principles rather than law reform of any sort, such proposals will not be deliberated 
upon in any detail. 
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i) Granting a compulsory license in respect of the patented gene to any 
downstream researcher; 
ii) Invoking the research exemption; and  
iii) A tightening of the patentability criteria and a rigorous examination 
procedure to limit the scope of a gene patent.  
 
Of these, the compulsory licensing scheme within patent law is perhaps the 
closest parallel to the doctrine of essential facilities under competition law75a
comparison in this regard will therefore be the primary focus of this discussion.  
 
1 Compulsory Licensing in Patent Law 
 
At the outset, it must be noted that there is no uniform law on compulsory 
licensing in Europe. As opposed to the EPC, the CPC does mention ‘compulsory 
licensing’. However its provisions amount to nothing more than an attempt to 
reconcile compulsory licensing provisions pertaining to national patents (under 
respective national laws) with a ‘community patent’ regime. Thus, for example, 
it is provided that national law provisions for the grant of compulsory licences 
(in respect of national patents) would be applicable to ‘community patents’ as 
well.76 In this part of the paper therefore, I have, much in line with my 
jurisdictional focus spelt out in the introduction, attempted to deal more with the 
English position than with a general pan-European position. 
 
In terms of the ‘compulsory licensing’ provisions in the UK patent regime,77 the 
main shortcomings when compared with the essential facilities doctrine are: 
75 The doctrine of ‘patent misuse’ is also relevant to this discussion. I do not engage with this, as 
this is primarily a US remedy, whereas my jurisdictional focus is EC law. 
76 Article 45 (CPC). 
77 The main statute regulating English patent law and practice since 1 June 1978 has been the 
Patents Act 1977 (as amended by the CDPA 1988) together with the Patent Rules, 1995 (made 
under the 1977 Act). The Act (hereafter ‘UK Patents Act’) is expressly intended to follow various 
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i) The scope of the grounds upon which a compulsory licence can be 
granted are very limited and cannot appropriately cater to a ‘blocking’ 
impasse. In the words of a commentator:78 
Recourse to the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ must be 
distinguished from the grant of compulsory licence, which is 
usually limited by rather strict conditions, especially a related 
invention of the licensee and the dependency of its use on 
such licence. The ‘essential facility concept’ has a broad 
operation. 
 
ii) There have been very few instances of the compulsory licensing 
regime in the UK actually being invoked, owing, in large part, to the 
procedural difficulties associated with invoking this remedy.79 A 1967 
US government study speculated that the UK compulsory licensing 
provisions may have been used infrequently because of the 
cumbersome and time-consuming procedures involved, which among 
other things permitted compulsory licensing only after a patent had 
been in force for at least three years.80 In contrast, the essential 
international conventions including the EPC, CPC, TRIPS, PCT and the Paris Convention. Each 
European patent granted for the UK is to be treated as if it were a UK patent granted under the 
1977 Actthis means interalia that validity and infringement are determined nationally. See BC 
Reid (Gen Editor) Sweet and Maxwell’s European Patent Litigation Handbook (Sweet and 
Maxwell London 1999).  
78 M Herdegen ‘Patenting Human Genes and other Parts of the Human Body under EC 
Biotechnology Directive’ (2001) 4(3) Bioscience L Rev 102, 106. 
79 D Perkins ‘Compulsory Licensing in Europe’ Impact of the Doha Public Health Declaration (ICC 
/ AIPLA joint conference Paris 13 September 2002). 
80 ‘US Department of Health, Education and Welfare’ (1968) 177, cited from FM Scherer ‘The 




facilities doctrine seems to be more widely applicable and is rapidly 
gaining momentum in Europe. 
 
In terms of limitations in the scope of ‘compulsory licensing’ grounds available, it 
is helpful to have a look at the specific provisions within the UK patent regime. 
The main grounds spelt out in section 48A81 that are relevant for the purpose of 
this discussion are: 
 
i) A demand in the UK for the patented product is not being met on 
reasonable terms; 
ii) A refusal to license the patent on reasonable terms prevents or 
hinders the exploitation in the UK of any other patented invention 
which involves an important technical advance of considerable 
economic significance; 
iii) A refusal to license on reasonable terms unfairly prejudices the 
establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in 
the UK. 
 
None of the above grounds would cater appropriately to blocking concerns in 
the biopharmaceutical industry. As regards the first ground, it may be difficult to 
argue that a demand for the upstream genetic invention is not being met. Such 
‘invention’ itself may be available in the markethowever this availability does 
81 The grounds in section 48A pertain to ‘WTO patent’ proprietors. In order to comply with 
TRIPS, UK patent law was amended in 1999 to distinguish between ‘WTO patent’ proprietors 
and ‘non-WTO patent’ proprietors when considering the applicable grounds for a compulsory 
licence. This difference is in large part influenced by Article 27 of TRIPS that bars the 
discrimination of patents on the basis of their being imported or worked in the UK. Thus, while 
the non-WTO applications could be subjected to a local working requirement (i.e. a compulsory 
license could issue if the invention is not worked in the UK), the WTO applications cannot be so 
subjected. See S Thorley et al Terell on the Law of Patents (15th edn Sweet and Maxwell London 
2002) 341. 
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not necessarily mean that it is also being reasonably licensed to downstream 
researchers. 
The second ground relates to what are known generally as ‘blocking patents’82.
The main limitation of this provision in addressing the blocking problem is that 
the downstream researcher requesting access to the upstream patent may not 
as yet hold a downstream patent.  
 
Similarly, in respect of the third ground, it may be difficult to qualify all cases of 
blocking in the biopharmaceutical industry as preventing ‘the establishment or 
development of commercial or industrial activities’. 
Quite apart from these grounds, some countries provide for ‘public health’ as a 
separate ‘compulsory licensing’ ground. Thus, for example, French law 
authorizes compulsory licenses when medicines are ‘only available to the public 
in insufficient quantity or quality or at abnormally high prices’.83 More recently, 
France amended this provision to cater to a Myriad-like situation where the 
patentee charges unreasonably high prices for genetic diagnostic testing kits.84 
Indeed, TRIPS specifically provides that WTO Members may adopt measures 
necessary to promote ‘public health’, subject to such measures being consistent 
with TRIPS.85 From this provision, as also the recent Doha declaration,86 it would 
82 See n 5.  
83 Article L 613-16 <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/france1.html> (20 October 2004).  
84 Article 18 of Loi n 2004-800 (6 August 2004) 
<www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=SANX0100053L> (20 October 2004).  
85 Article 8 (1) of TRIPS. While the TRIPS framework does not contain extensive provisions on 
available grounds (member states are left to determine such grounds themselves), it is quite 
specific with respect to the conditions to be met should a compulsory license be granted. These 
conditions include, interalia the requirement (in certain cases) that a license be voluntarily 
requested before being granted on compulsory terms, non-exclusivity, and an adequate 
remuneration to the patent holder. See Articles 8, 30 and 31.   
86 The fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO issued a declaration in Doha (Qatar) in order to 
elucidate the TRIPS Agreement. The declaration stated in pertinent part that  ‘…the Agreement 
can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right 
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.’ See 
‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (14 November 
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appear that TRIPS endorses a compulsory licensing ground based substantially 
on public health.  
This ground may not however directly help in the context of a ‘blocking’ impasse 
as it assumes the existence of an immediate public health issue and the 
presence of (or immediate potential for) a product ready to address this. In the 
context of biopharmaceutical research using an upstream patented gene, a 
downstream product may not as yet be availablein fact, it may be several 
years away from coming into fruition. Further, not every blocking or restricted 
issue can be readily classified as a ‘public health’ issue.  
 
2 Scope of the ‘Research Exemption’ 
A ‘research exemption’ that permits downstream researchers to ‘use’ the 
patented gene sequence is another way of tackling the blocking impasse. 
However the scope of this exception is limited, rendering it an inappropriate tool 
for the context under discussion.  
In the UK, the ‘experimental use’ exemption is codified under section 60(5)(b) of 
the UK Patents Act and covers in pertinent part, an act ‘done for experimental 
purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention’. Apart from Monsanto v 
Stauffer,87 which indicates that the scope of this section is limited, there is not 
much case law to help assess the proper scope of this section. However going 
by the wordings of the statute, it appears that section 60(5)(b) has an important 
2001) paragraph 4 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> (22 September 
2004).  
87 [1985] RPC 515.  In the US, the exception is even more limited. Whittemore v Cutter 29 F Cas 
1120 (CCD Mass 1813), perhaps the earliest case on this point, expressly limits the exception to 
acts conducted solely for the purpose of philosophical or scientific inquiry. This was reiterated in 
a recent case, Madey v Duke 307 F 3d 1351 (Fed Cir 2002), where the US Supreme Court 
shifted the focus of the experimental use defence from the ‘commercial versus non-commercial’ 
nature of the experimentation and the ‘profit versus non-profit’ status of the alleged infringer to 
merely a question of whether the use was in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate 
business. 
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limitationthe ‘experimental use’ must ‘relate to the subject matter of the 
invention’. This could be interpreted to mean that the section appears to permit 
experimentation ‘on’, but not ‘with’, the invention.  
 
This distinction becomes particularly relevant in the context of those gene 
patents that qualify as ‘research tools’. ‘Research tool’ patents constitute a 
rather unique genre of patents, in that their predominant utility is in research 
itself. If everyone were allowed to construct a research tool on their own, use it 
for further research, and successfully claim shelter under the 'experimental use' 
exemption, the grant of a patent to ‘research tools’ would become 
meaningless.88 Consequently, a distinction between ‘experimenting on’, and 
‘experimenting with’ prevents such patents from being rendered ineffective. 
However this would also mean that in the specific context of blocking, which 
requires a downstream researcher to work ‘with’ an invention, this exception is 
only of limited utility.89 
The research exemption is limited in another significant way: it may not permit 
the manufacture or sale of the downstream product, if such product or its 
manufacture incorporates/uses the patented gene sequence. Perhaps here, the 
compulsory licensing ground pertaining to ‘blocking patents’ could help, if the  
downstream product were covered by a patent as well.90 
88 See J M Mueller ‘No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking The Experimental Use Exception To Patent 
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools’ (2001) 76 Wash L Rev 1, 13.  
89 However, it is important to note that not every gene patent would amount to a research tool.  
90 See text to n 82. 
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3 Stricter Patentability Criteria 
 
Adopting stricter patentability criteria is yet another way of reducing the 
potential for blocking patents. This could not only result in a reduction in the 
scope of protection granted to the patent (consequently increasing the chances 
of ‘inventing around’ such claims) but in some cases result in the patent not 
being granted at all. However, relying on strict examination standards suffers 
from certain drawbacks: 
 
i) Firstly, the proposed solution is an ex-ante one. What does one do 
about all the overbroad patents that have already been issued? It 
could be argued that some of them could be invalidated.91 However, 
invalidation/revocation is not an easy procedure and is also subject to 
considerable costs.92 
ii) More importantly, the potential of patent law to cater to and deal with 
blocking concerns that may fructify in future through a circumspect 
and rather futuristic application of patenting pre-requisites is 
limitedparticularly since most patent offices are faced with a 
considerable backlog of pending applications.93 In this context, the 
91 ‘Nearly half of all litigated patents are held invalid’. JR Allison & MA Lemley ‘Empirical Evidence 
on the Validity of Litigated Patents’ (1998) 26 AIPLA Quarterly J 185, 205. See also M Lemley 
and C Shapiro ‘Probabilistic Patents’ 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=567883> (6 November 2004). 
92 For a good critique of invalidation as an effective means of weeding out bad patents, see J 
Farrell and RP Merges ‘Incentives To Challenge And Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t 
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors And Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help’ (2004) 19 
Berkeley Tech LJ 1. They highlight the grossly skewed incentives to challenge and defend issued 
patents and instead recommend, inter alia the creation of a cheap and workable administrative 
post-issue review.  
93 Prof Lemley has in fact recommended against expending resources to better the quality of 
patents granted by the patent office. His argument is that since very few patents are actually 
litigated or licensed, society would be better off spending its resources in a more searching 
judicial inquiry into validity in those few cases in which it matters than paying for a more 
protracted examination of all patents ex ante. In economic terms, the patent office is ‘rationally 
39
need for an effective ex-post remedy, such as the doctrine of essential 
facilities, cannot be overstated.  
 
C MERITS OF A COMPETITION LAW REMEDY 
 
As the above discussion demonstrates, ‘internal’ remedies within patent law are 
inadequate to address the blocking or restricted access issue. The doctrine of 
essential facilities, being a competition law remedy, appears more suited to 
redress this problem.94 
i) Firstly, as mentioned earlier, an optimal resolution of the ‘blocking’ or 
‘restricted access’ issue involves a significant amount of economic 
analysisa task which an antitrust authority is well placed to 
undertake.95 
ii) Secondly, the investigative powers of a competition authority are far 
superior to that of traditional patent authorities.96 In an industry such 
as the biopharmaceutical one, where industry information is difficult 
to procure, there are significant advantages in having such a dispute 
ignorant’ of the objective validity of the patents it issues. See MA Lemley Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office 95 Northwestern University Law Review 4 (2001) 1. However for a critique of 
this, see Farrell and Merges (n 92) who state that the often grossly skewed incentives to 
challenge and to defend issued patents make this view of Professor Lemley (that ex-post 
litigation would solve the problem of bad patents) too optimistic. 
94 Chapters IV and V will explain this doctrine in greater detail and demonstrate how it could 
potentially address this issue in a more optimal manner. It needs to be noted however that a full 
fledged comparison cannot be undertaken at this stage, as this paper delves into only one of the 
limbs of the essential facilities doctrine-namely that of ‘essentiality’ or ‘indispensability’. 
95 Text to n 10. This is a hypothesis that can be validated only after I have applied the essential 
facilities doctrine in its entirety to the blocking dilemma.  
96 For a good discussion of the investigative powers of the European Commission, see A Tissot-
Favre ‘The Investigative Powers Of The European Commission’ (2003) 14(10) Intl Company and 
Commercial L Rev 319. 
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resolved by a body that has the ability to investigate and call for 
information with ease.97 
iii) It could also be argued that a compulsory licence on the grounds of 
anticompetitive behaviour is accorded far greater latitude under TRIPS 
than are other traditional compulsory licensing groundsmost of 
which are subject to the procedurally burdensome requirements spelt 
out in Article 31 (k).98 
Having said this, it is also important to recognise that the application of an 
antitrust remedy can at certain levels be more burdensome than resorting to 
internal remedies within patent law. Illustratively, in the context of application of 
the essential facilities doctrine, one needs first to establish that the patentee 
holds a dominant position in the market. This is a fairly complicated task 
requiring one to define the ‘relevant market’, establish ‘market share’ etc. After 
crossing this hurdle, one has to demonstrate that the refusal to license amounts 
to an abuse. These aspects will be dealt with in the next chapter.  
 
97 In the context of the concerns over exclusive licensing practices with respect to disease gene 
patents, a recent paper states that ‘extremely little is known about the licensing behaviour of 
firms and universities’. See Henry et al ‘Pilot survey on the licensing of DNA inventions’ 442. 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 31 (2003) 442. 
98 J Berger ‘Advancing Public Health By Other Means: Using Competition Policy To Increase 
Access To Essential Medicines’ ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Ensuring Policy Options for 





THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ASSESSING ESSENTIALITY/INDISPENSABILITY 
 
With me everything turns into mathematics Rene Descartes 
The doctrine of essential facilities is designed to deal with the danger that a 
monopolist in control of a scarce resource will extend its monopoly power 
vertically from one level of production to another. In its application to 
intellectual property, this doctrine has not met with a particularly warm 
welcome.  
 
This doctrine originated in the US99 and has been most widely applied in 
regulating access to physical infrastructure such as transport facilities100 and 
utility networks.101 AG Jacobs summarised the US position in Bronner:102 
The US essential facilities doctrine has developed to require a 
company with monopoly power to contract with a competitor 
where five conditions are met. First, an essential facility is 
controlled by a monopolist. A facility will be regarded as essential 
when access to it is indispensable in order to compete on the 
99 For an excellent analysis of this doctrine in the US context, see AB Lipsky and G Sidak 
‘Essential Facilities’ (1999) 51 Stan L Rev 1187. See also R Pitofsky D Patterson and J Hooks 
‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law’ (2002) 70 Antitrust LJ 443. 
100 United States v Terminal Railroad Association 224 US 383 (1912). This case pertained to 
railroad bridges serving the town of St Louis.  
101 MCI Communications v AT&T 708 F 2d 1081 (7th Cir 1983) (where a local 
telecommunications network was ordered to provide access to its facility) and Otter Tail Power 
Co v United States 410 US 366 (1973) (where the essential facility in question was a local 
electricity network). 
102 Bronner AG (n 11) [47]. 
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market with the company that controls it…. Secondly, a 
competitor is unable practically or reasonably to duplicate the 
essential facility. It is not sufficient that duplication would be 
difficult or expensive, but absolute impossibility is not required. 
Thirdly, the use of the facility is denied to a competitor. That 
condition would appear to include the refusal to contract on 
reasonable terms. Fourthly, it is feasible for the facility to be 
provided. Fifthly, there is no legitimate business reason for 
refusing access to the facility. A company in a dominant position 
which controls an essential facility can justify the refusal to enter 
a contract for legitimate technical or commercial reasons. It may 
also be possible to justify a refusal to contract on grounds of 
efficiency.  
 
With the Supreme Court’s recent expression of hostility towards this doctrine in 
Trinko,103 the extent of applicability of this doctrine in the US is not clear. It has 
however come to gain prominence in Europe,104 with the ECJ delivering a much-
awaited decision last year.105 
A EUROPEAN POSITION: ARTICLE 82 
 
103 Verizon Communications Inc v Curtis V Trinko LLP 540 US 682 (2004) (hereafter ‘Trinko’) 
dealt with a complaint against a local telephone monopolist that had refused to deal with its 
rivals. The Supreme Court observed that the essential facilities doctrine had been ‘crafted by 
some lower courts’ and found that there was no need to either recognize it or to repudiate it 
here. It reasoned that that the Telecommunications Act's extensive provision for access to an 
incumbent's network ‘makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access’ (880-
81). 
104 See JT Lang ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors and 
Access to Essential Facilities’ (1994) 18 Fordham Intl LJ 437, 439. 
105 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG (C418/01)  [2004] All ER (EC) 813 
(ECJ (5th Chamber)) (hereinafter ‘IMS (ECJ)’).  
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The essential facilities doctrine derives from Article 82 of the EC (European 
Community) Treaty,106 which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. This 
article reads: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it 
may affect trade between member states. Such abuse may, in 
particular, consist in: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
As can be seen from the above, Article 82 requires an abusive act107 by a 
‘dominant’108 undertaking within the EC or a substantial part of it109 in a manner 
that actually or potentially affects trade between Member States.110 
106 The UK parallel is in section 18(1) of the Competition Act 1988  (the Chapter II prohibition) 
(hereafter ‘UK Competition Act’).  
107 As held in Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v Commission [2000] ECR I-1365, the 
list proposed in Article 82 is not exhaustive. 
108 The ECJ has defined ‘dominance’ as ‘a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
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Thus, ‘dominance’ per se is not prohibited under Article 82; rather, it is only the 
‘abuse’ of such dominance that triggers the application of Article 82. A refusal to 
provide access to an essential facility could, in certain circumstances, 
tantamount to an ‘abuse’.  
 
An examination of some of the ‘essential facilities’ or ‘refusal to supply’ cases will  
help us understand the parameters of this doctrine better, particularly in its 
application to intellectual property. It is important to note in this context that 
the courts have never expressly used the term ‘essential facilities doctrine’111
rather it appears that most such issues were dealt with under the broad rubric 
of ‘refusal to supply’ cases, originating as far back as Commercial Solvents.112 
Indeed, there is considerable debate on whether the European courts have 
accepted or endorsed an essential facilities doctrine. Therefore, as stated in the 
introduction, this paper will use the term ‘essential facilities doctrine’ merely as a 
label, assuming that this term is what most closely captures the principles and 
market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers’. Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche 
[1979] ECR 461. 
109 For a discussion on this term, see Case 40/73 Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] ECR 1663. 
110 Case 6/73 & 7/73 Instituto Chemiotripico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v 
Commission [1974] ECR 223 [30] – [35] which held that conduct could be said to have an effect 
on interstate trade when it altered the competitive structure of the market.  
111 See n 11. ‘The courts have never acknowledged the existence of an essential facilities 
doctrine separate from the principle of refusal to supply set out in Commercial Solvents v 
Commission’. See D Aitman and A Jones ‘Competition Law And Copyright: Has The Copyright 
Owner Lost The Ability To Control His Copyright’ (2004) 26(3) EIPR 137. The Commission has 
however referred to the essential facilities doctrine in some of its decisions, beginning 
with Sea Containers Ltd / Stena Sealink  [1994] OJ L15/8. 
112 Cases 6&7/73 Commercial Solvents v Commission [1973] ECR 223; [1974] 1 CMLR 309. It 
was held here that an undertaking in a dominant position as regards production of a raw 
material could not cease supplying an existing customer who manufactured derivatives of the 
raw material simply because it had decided to start manufacturing the derivative itself and 
wished to eliminate its former customer from the market.  
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propositions laid down in the refusal to deal (or analogous) cases by the 
European Commission and courts.113 
My focus will be on only one of the limbs of this doctrine, albeit the most 
fundamental onethe requirement of  ‘essentiality’ or ‘indispensability’.114 More 
specifically, my effort will be to analyse case law and derive a framework for 
determining the ‘essentiality’ or ‘indispensability’ of a ‘facility’. 
 
1 Volvo v Veng 
 
In terms of the application of the essential facilities doctrine to intellectual 
property cases, a good starting point is Volvo v Veng.115 The case concerned the 
front wings of the Volvo series 200 cars, on which Volvo held a registered 
design. Veng, a British company imported these products, manufactured 
reproductions of them, and marketed them in the UK without authority from 
Volvo. Upon Volvo instituting proceedings for an infringement of its registered 
design, Veng argued that by refusing access to its design, Volvo committed an 
abuse of its dominant position. 
 
The ECJ stressed that a refusal to grant a licence to a third party would not, by 
itself, constitute an abuse of a dominant position. Rather, Article 82 requires 
factors over and above a mere refusal to license. Illustratively, the ECJ held that 
a refusal to license might be abusive, if coupled with: 
 
(1) an arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers; 
113 See n 11. See also Lang (n 104) 483 who notes, in relation to the term ‘essential facilities 
doctrine’ that the ‘concept may be merely a useful label ... rather than an analytical tool’. 
114 As regards the other limbs of this doctrine or of Article 82 in general, I will, for the purpose of 
this paper, assume that they stand satisfied. Thus for example, it would be assumed that the 
alleged abusive act is ‘committed within the EC or a substantial part of it’, the said act ‘affects 
trade between Member States’ etc.  
115 Case 238/87 Volvo v Veng [1988] ECR 6211; [1989] 4 CMLR 122. 
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(2) overcharging for spare parts; or  
(3) ceasing to produce spare parts for a particular model when there were 
many vehicles of that model still on the road.116 
2 Magill v BBC  
 
Magill is the first EC case in which a refusal to license an intellectual property 
right (IPR) was held to constitute an abuse under Article 82.117 
Magill published a weekly television guide containing programme schedules for 
all the television channels in Ireland. At that time, the broadcasting and 
television stations, RTE, BBC and ITV (hereafter ‘broadcasters’) published 
separate weekly guides to their own programmes. All of them supplied 
programme information free to daily newspapers, which were allowed to publish 
one day’s listings (or two days’ listings at weekends or where the following day 
was a public holiday). However, publication of the weekly listings was not 
authorisedthe broadcasters had reserved this right for themselves relying on 
Irish copyright rules. The broadcasters successfully sought an injunction to 
prevent the continued publication of the Magill comprehensive weekly guide on 
the basis that, as literary works and compilations, the schedules were entitled to 
copyright protection.  
 
Magill lodged a complaint with the Commission alleging that the broadcasters 
refusal to license the weekly listings amounted to an abuse within the meaning 
of Article 82. The Commission found that the broadcasters had abused their 
116 ibid [9].  
117 Magill TV Guide [1989] OJ L78/43, affirmed by the CFI in Case T-69/89 RTE v European 
Commission [1991] ECR II-485, [1991] 4 CMLR 586; Case T-76/89 ITP v European Commission 
[1991] ECR II-575, [1991] 4 CMLR 475; Case T-70/89 BBC v European Commission [1991] ECR 
II-535, [1991] 4 CMLR 669; affirmed by the ECJ in Joined Cases C 241 & 242/91 P RTE and ITP 
v. European Commission [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718 (the ECJ decision will hereafter 
be referred to as ‘Magill’). See n 71. 
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respective dominant positions on the market; their refusal had prevented the 
introduction onto the market of a new product for which there was substantial 
potential demand. It therefore ordered that the broadcasters license each other 
and third parties on a non-discriminatory basis, a decision confirmed by the 
Court of First Instance (hereafter ‘CFI’) and the ECJ. 
 
The ECJ began by cautioning that mere ownership of an intellectual property 
right would not, by itself, confer ‘dominance’.118 However, in this particular case, 
the court found that the broadcasters were in a ‘dominant position’, as they 
enjoyed a de facto monopoly over the television programme information used to 
compile listings.119 
In coming to the conclusion that there was an abuse of a dominant position, the 
court reiterated the principle in Volvo that a mere refusal to license would not 
constitute an abuserather, there have to be certain ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, which in this case, were articulated by the court as follows:  
 
i) The broadcasters’ refusal to license television listings prevented the 
emergence of a new product (a ‘comprehensive TV guide’), ‘which the 
broadcasters did not offer and for which there was a potential 
consumer demand.’120 
ii) There was ‘no justification for such refusal either in the activity of the 
television broadcasting or in that of publishing television 
magazines’.121 
iii) The broadcasters, by denying access to ‘the raw material 
indispensable for the compilation’ of a TV guide, ‘reserved to 
118 Magill (n 71) [46]. 
119 ibid [47]. 
120 ibid [54]. 
121 ibid [55]. 
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themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by 
excluding all competition on that market’.122 
Therefore, the refusal was an abuse under Article 82(b). However what was not 
clear from the above was whether the conditions constituting the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ were cumulative or distinctif cumulative, then one needed all 
three conditions to be satisfied prior to making a determination that a refusal to 
grant a license amounts to an abuse. This issue was later resolved (in favour of 
the conditions being ‘cumulative’ ones) by IMS. 123 
By evolving an ‘exceptional circumstances’ framework, Magill was perhaps the 
first case which helped identify some parameters to assist in a determination of 
when a refusal to license an intellectual property would constitute an abuse.  
 
It may be suggested that implicit in the Magill judgement was a belief that 
copyright in a mere television listing did not merit intellectual property 
protection. In the words of a commentator:  
 
The low intrinsic value of the right was not expressly mentioned in 
the Magill case by the Courts (their role is not to comment on the 
appropriateness of national copyright rules)….It was, however, 
clearly part of the equation.124 
122 ibid [56]. 
123 IMS (ECJ) (n 105). The IMS case will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
124 IS Forrester ‘Compulsory licensing in Europe: A Rare Cure to Aberrant National Intellectual 
Property Rights?’ DOJ/FTC Hearings <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522forrester.pdf> 
(14 September 2004) 12. This underlying assumption was also hinted at by AG Jacobs in 
Bronner (AG) (n 11) [63] when he stated that ‘the provision of copyright protection for 
programme listings was difficult to justify in terms of rewarding or providing an incentive for 
creative effort.’  
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It must be noted that a key factor underlying this judgment was that of 
‘essentiality’ or ‘indispensability’ i.e. the weekly listings were not reasonably and 
practically replicableand no amount of innovation could have produced an 
alternative. In the court’s words, they were ‘indispensable raw material’.125 
Surprisingly, the court never expressly articulated this as a separate 
factorhowever it clearly was an underlying assumption that informed the 
judgment. It was not until Ladbroke and more importantly, Bronner that the 
European courts began fleshing out the concept of ‘essentiality’ or 
‘indispensability’. 
 
3 Tierce Ladbroke v PMU 
The main issue in Ladbroke126 was whether or not a refusal by PMU (a French 
horse racing enterprise), to license audiovisual recordings of French horse races 
to Ladbroke's Belgian betting shops amounted to an abuse of a dominant 
position. The Commission found in favour of PMU. 
 
Upholding the Commission’s decision, the CFI rejected an attempt by Ladbroke 
to invoke Magill for two primary reasons: 
 
i) PMU was not present on the betting market in Belgium. 
ii) The sound and pictures of the races were not ‘essential’ for Ladbrokes 
activity.127 
The CFI went on to apply the ‘essentiality’ limb thus: 
 
125 Magill (n 71) [53].  
126 Case T-504/93 Tierce Ladbroke v Commission [1997] ECR II-923; [1997] 5 CMLR 309. 
127 ibid [131]. 
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In this case, as moreover the Commission and the interveners have 
pointed out, the televised broadcasting of horse races, although 
constituting an additional, and indeed suitable, service for bettors, it 
is not in itself indispensable for the exercise of bookmakers' main 
activity, namely the taking of bets, as is evidenced by the fact that 
the applicant is present on the Belgian betting market and occupies 
a significant position as regards bets on French races.  Moreover, 
transmission is not indispensable, since it takes place after bets are 
placed, with the result that its absence does not in itself affect the 
choices made by bettors and, accordingly, cannot prevent 
bookmakers from pursuing their business.128 
4 Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint 
 
Although no ‘intellectual property’ was at issue in Bronner, the case is extremely 
significant, as perhaps the first one to engage with the ‘essentiality’ limb in 
some detail and draw out a robust framework for its assessment.  
 
In this case, Bronner alleged that Mediaprint was abusing its dominant position 
by refusing to include his publication in its distribution network. The key issue 
was whether the Mediaprint’s nation-wide home-delivery network for 
newspapers constituted an ‘essential facility’.  
 
The ECJ reiterated that a refusal to license is abusive only in ‘exceptional’ 
circumstancesif the conditions below were satisfied:  
 
128 ibid [132]. 
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i) The refusal to give Bronner access to Mediaprint’s home-delivery 
system would be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily 
newspaper market;  
ii) Such refusal could not be objectively justified; and  
iii) The home-delivery service was indispensable to carrying on Bronner’s 
business, inasmuch as there was no actual or potential substitute in 
existence for that home-delivery service.129 
On the facts of the case, however, the ECJ did not regard the above conditions 
as being satisfied, particularly the third condition pertaining to ‘essentiality’ or 
‘indispensability’.130 The court elaborated on this by stating that: 
 
Moreover, it does not appear that there are any technical, legal or 
economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even 
unreasonably difficult for any other publisher of daily newspapers 
to establish, alone or in cooperation with other publishers, its own 
nationwide home-delivery scheme and to use it to distribute its own 
daily newspapers.131 
The court also found that other methods of distribution, such as by post and by 
sale in shops or kiosks, was available, even if they constituted less 
advantageous means of distribution. In this sense, the court was stressing the 
fact that a  ‘mere disadvantage’ would not constitute an ‘economic obstacle’. 
Further, in order to accept the existence of economic obstacles, it had to be 
established that the creation of products or services by a competitor was not 
129 ibid [41]. 
130 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v Media Print GmBH [1998] ECR I-7791. This case came up 
before the ECJ as a referral from the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Higher Regional Court, Vienna), in 
its capacity as the Kartellgericht (Court of first instance in competition matters). 
131 ibid [44]. 
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economically viable for production on a scale comparable to that of the 
undertaking which controlled the essential facility in question.132 
The ECJ also pointed out that the test of ‘economic feasibility’ was an objective 
oneBronner had to show that it was not only Bronner that could not develop 
an alternative home-delivery system, but that an alternative home-delivery 
system was not a realistic option for any of Mediaprint’s actual or potential 
competitors in the daily newspaper market.133 
It also bears mention that AG Jacobs had pointed out in his opinion that the 
very fact that Bronner’s newspaper had a significant circulation in the market 
meant that Mediaprint’s facility was not an ‘essential’ one to which Bronner 
needed access in order to compete effectively in the market. 134
(a) Bronner  Framework 
 
Bronner represents the first case where the court focussed on the ‘essentiality’ 
or ‘indispensability’ limb of the essential facilities doctrine and attempted to map 
out a framework for assessing ‘essentiality’. This framework can be crystallised 
in terms of the following propositions: 
 
i) Legal, Technical and Economic obstacles: A facility is essential only 
when duplication of the facility or creation of an alternative is 
impossible or extremely difficult owing to legal, technical and 
economic obstacles. 
132 ibid [46].  
133 The AG had while stating this in similar terms reiterated the broad underlying theme that 
competition law was to protect competition in the market and not individual consumers. See 
Bronner (AG) (n 11) [58].  
134 ‘….that conclusion is borne out by the claims made in Der Standard itself that 'the "Standard" 
is enjoying spectacular growth in terms of both new subscriptions (an increase of 15%) and 
placement of advertisements (an increase of 30% by comparison with last year)'. ibid [67].  
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ii) Economic Viability Standard: While assessing the economic viability of 
of an alternative ‘facility’, one has to assume that the business 
operations (via the facility) of the competing undertaking would be on 
a scale comparable to that of the undertaking that owns the existing 
facility. In other words, as was the case in Bronner, it is not enough to 
argue that an alternative facility is not economically viable by reason 
of the small circulation of the competitors’ daily newspaper or 
newspapers.  
 
iii) Mere Disadvantage: Mere economic disadvantage is not the same as 
‘economic non viability’ and will not count while categorising 
something as an essential facility. 
 
iv) Objective Assessment: While assessing ‘viability’, the test has to be an 
objective onenot merely whether it would be non-viable for the 
undertaking requesting access to the ‘essential facility’, but whether it 
would not be so viable for any other party wishing to compete. 
 
5 IMS Health v NDC 
This case involved a series of proceedings, some before the European 
Commission/courts and some before national courts. The key issues were 
referred to the ECJ, which handed down its judgment last year.135 
IMS Health is a world leader in data collection pertaining to pharmaceutical sales 
and prescriptions. In pursuance of its business, it created a brick structure 
(‘1860 brick structure’), which segments Germany into sales zones or bricks. The 
135 IMS (ECJ) (n 105).  
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idea underlying the brick structure is to partition Germany into the maximum 
number of geographical units that permits data collection without the ability to 
match the data to a specific pharmacyas this would contravene German data 
protection rules.136 The 1860 brick structure soon developed into a ‘de facto 
industry standard’ and came to be widely used by German pharmaceutical 
companies to analyse sales trends, measure market shares, and gauge the 
performance of sales representatives.137 IMS claimed copyright over its brick 
structure and successfully brought actions before the German courts against 
competitors using such structure.138 
During the course of these national proceedings, one competitor, NDC 
complained to the Commission and alleged that a refusal to license the brick 
structure by IMS amounted to an abuse under Article 82. The Commission found 
in favour of NDC and passed an interim order requiring IMS to grant a licence to 
competitors.139 
(a) Commission Decision 
 
The Commission’s decision in large part turned on the fact that certain obstacles 
made it almost impossible for competitors to create a new structure for regional 
136 In Germany, data  privacy  protection  rules  (Federal Data Protection Act 
[Bundesdatenschutzgesetz] as most recently amended on 23 May 2001) require  that  at  least  
three pharmacies be aggregated. See IMS I (n 68) [14]. 
137 ibid [89]. 
138 In particular, the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt District Court) had granted, 
between October and December 2000, separate injunctions prohibiting NDC (an American 
multinational company), AzyX (a much smaller Belgian company) and Pharma Intranet 
Information (PI) from using structures derived from the 1860 brick structure on the basis that 
IMS enjoyed copyright protection. This injunction was however modified slightly subsequently by 
an appellate court to permit some alternative structures. This ruling coupled with the fact that 
NDC Health's market position improved (such that there was no longer any urgency) led the 
Commission to subsequently withdraw the interim measures on August 13, 2003. See 
Commission Decision 2003/741 [2003] OJ L268/69 (hereafter ‘IMS II’).  
139 See IMS I (n 68).  
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sales data in Germany. These obstacles could be categorised in the Bronner 
mould as ‘legal, technical and economic’ obstacles. 
 
(i) Economic Obstacles:  
 
Of the various obstacles that made it impossible or extremely difficult to create 
an alternative brick structure, the economic ones are perhaps the most 
significant and will therefore be dealt with first. The key economic obstacle 
stemmed from the fact that the copyrighted 1860 brick structure was akin to a 
de facto industry standard, to which competitors were effectively  ‘locked in’.140 
The substantial role played by the pharmaceutical companies, alongside IMS, in 
the design of the 1860 brick structure contributed to the creation of this 
relationship of dependency.141 
Consequently, availing of another structure would have entailed significant 
‘switching’ costs by customers (pharmaceutical companies). More specifically:  
 
i) A new structure would have entailed changing the territories in which 
sale representatives operated,142 leading to: 
a. Disruptions in existing relationships between sales representatives 
and the doctors that they routinely visited. 
b. Modification of employment agreements between the 
pharmaceutical companies and their sales representatives. 
 
140 ibid [86]-[92]. 
141 ‘The input which the pharmaceutical companies have made to the structure have contributed 
greatly to its status as a de facto industry standard and to their current dependence on this 
structure as a format for the receipt of regional sales data services.’ IMS I (n 68) [185]. 
142 ibid [89]. 
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ii) An alternative brick structure would have also necessitated the costly 
modification of existing software used by pharmaceutical 
companies.143 
As the Commission succinctly summed up:144 
The pharmaceutical companies have become locked in to this 
standard such that to switch away from it to buy sales data 
formatted in a non-compatible structure, whilst theoretically 
possible, would be an unviable economic proposition. 
(ii) Legal Obstacles: 
 
The legal obstacles presented themselves in the form of: 
 
a) copyright law, which prevented the creation of structures, similar 
to the 1860 brick structure; 145 and 
b) data protection law, which limited the number of ways in which 
copyright in the 1860 structure could be circumvented by the 
creation of alternatives.146 
(iii) Technical Obstacles: 
 
143 ibid [122]. 
144 ibid [92]. 
145 See IMS I (n 68) [143]-[145]. Although the decision of the German lower court (holding the 
competing structures to be copyright violations) was under appeal, the Commission assumed for 
the purpose of its analysis that there was considerable ‘legal uncertainty’ that placed significant 
constraints on the creation of alternatives. See text to n 167.  
146 ‘On balance, and in the context of these interim measures proceedings, the Commission 
considers that there is a probability that German data protection laws do impose certain 
constraints on the construction of a second structure in Germany. See IMS I (n 68) [142].  
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The need to respect postcode boundaries was highlighted by the Commission as 
a prominent technical obstacle rendering the creation of an alternative an 
‘impossible’ or ‘extremely difficult’ task. As the Commission explained: 
 
[T]here are clearly very strong reasons for using postcodes as the 
basis for a structure. Other data with which pharmaceutical sales 
data is integrated is provided in this format; it appears the only 
practical way to allocate doctors and pharmacies to particular 
bricks….147 
The Commission therefore concluded that ‘…the clear importance of using postal 




Based on all the above, the Commission found that: 
 
In this case, in the specific and exceptional circumstances in which 
the "1860 brick structure" was developed and copyright was 
asserted and found to subsist, the work in question for the technical, 
legal and economic constraints referred to above is incapable of 
being replicated by means of a non-infringing parallel creation.149 
(b) CFI Decision 
 
The President of the CFI suspended the Commission decision on the ground that 
147 [133]. 
148 [132]. 
149 IMS I (n 68) [184]. 
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the Commission seemed to take a fairly liberal view of the notion of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ articulated in Magill.150 In particular, the CFI was concerned that 
the Commission regarded the Magill conditions as non-cumulative i.e. the 
Commission did not regard it as necessary that the refusal to license should 
prevent the emergence of a ‘new product or service’ for which there was 
‘potential consumer demand’.151 It is to be noted however that this order of the 
CFI did not overrule the Commission’s assessment of ‘essentiality’ or 
‘indispensability’ of the 1860 brick structure. 
 
(c) The ECJ Decision 
 
As mentioned earlier, it was during the course of national proceedings that IMS 
had complained to the Commission. The Commission’s ruling was appealed to 
the CFI and thereafter to the ECJ. During the course of these proceedings, the 
national courts referred certain questions separately to the ECJ under Art 234 of 
the EC Treaty, which are summarised below: 
 
i) Whether the mere refusal by IMS Health to license a brick structure 
that was akin to an industry standard would contravene Article 82?152 
ii) The significance of the pharmaceutical industry’s involvement in 
developing the 1860 brick structure in assessing whether a refusal to 
license such structure constitutes an abuse; and 
iii) The significance of the ‘switching’ costs that the pharmaceutical 
150 The President of the Court of First Instance (CFI) provisionally suspended the interim 
measures on August 10, 2001 and then confirmed this suspension on October 26, 2001 pending 
the CFI's judgment in the main action under Art 230. See Case T-184/01 R IMS Health v 
Commission [2001] ECR II-2349 and 3193 (hereafter ‘IMS III’).  
151 The Commission had held in this regard: ‘As clarified in the Ladbroke judgement, there is no 
requirement for a refusal to supply to prevent the emergence of a new product in order to be 
abusive’. See IMS I (n 68) [180].  
152 Although the word ‘standard’ was not explicitly used in this question, the notion of a standard 
was implied. 
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industry would have to undergo (in switching to an alternative 
structure) in assessing whether the refusal to license constitutes an 
abuse. 
 
In answer to the first question, the ECJ stated that mere indispensability (as a 
‘standard’) would not, by itself, constitute ‘abuse’. Rather the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ drawn out by Magill have to be present. In the court’s words: 
 
Therefore, the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position to 
allow access to a product protected by copyright, where that 
product is indispensable for operating on a secondary market, may 
be regarded as abusive only where the undertaking which requested 
the licence does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating 
the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by 
the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or 
services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is 
a potential consumer demand.153 
It is important to note that the court also went on to clarify that the Magill 
conditions constituting the ‘exceptional circumstances’ framework were 
cumulative. Thus, the court endorsed the CFI objection to the Commission 
reading the Magill conditions as separate and distinct. Also in terms of the 
traditional two market distinction and the need to identify two distinct markets, 
the ECJ endorsed the view in Bronner that ‘it was sufficient that a potential 
market or even hypothetical market can be identified.’154 
153 IMS (ECJ) (n 105) [49]. 
154 ibid [45]. I will however, focus only on the ‘essentiality’ limb and not deal in any detail with 
the other aspects of the essential facilities doctrine, as evolved through case law. I will take 
these factors to be satisfiedin much the same way that I assume at the beginning of this 
chapter that factors such as conduct ‘affecting the EC or a substantial part of it’ stand satisfied 
(see n 114). 
60
To the second and third questions, the ECJ clarified that these factors (customer 
participation in the development of the standard and ‘switching costs’ in moving 
to an alternate structure) would be relevant to an assessment of whether the 
facility is ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ in the first place.  
 
In the process of answering these questions, the courts did engage in some 
discussion of the ‘essentiality’ or indispensability’ of the brick structure. The 
court endorsed the key test in Bronner that it had to be established, at the very 
least, that the creation of an alternative was impossible or extremely difficult 
owing to legal, technical or economic obstacles. However unlike the 
Commission, the ECJ did not delve into this issue in detail; rather it categorised 
the issue of whether the structure constituted an essential facility as a factual 
one, to be ultimately determined by the national courts. This reluctance stems 
from the fact that the above issues came up to the ECJ by way of referral from 
a national court. The Commission, on the other hand, faced no such constraints 
and therefore engaged with the facts in a more substantial way.155 
B BROAD CONCLUSIONS FROM CASE LAW 
 
Although the parameters of the essential facilities doctrine are yet to be worked 
out fully by the courts in Europe, some broad conclusions can be drawn from 
case law. 
 
1. The essential facilities doctrine is a subset of the wider mandate to refrain 
from abusing a dominant position under Article 82. Prior to a finding that 
there has been an abuse, ‘dominance’ in a given market is to be 
155 Being factual issues, it appears that the various obstacles highlighted by the Commission 
would have been endorsed by the ECJ, had the opportunity presented itself for such a review.  
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established. The courts have been cautious to state that mere ownership 
of intellectual property would not, by itself, confer ‘dominance’.156 
2. A mere refusal to license an intellectual property is not sufficient to 
invoke the essential facilities doctrine. Rather, as stressed in Volvo v 
Veng, there have to be additional ‘exceptional circumstances’.  
 
3. Although the precise ambit of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ framework 
is yet to be articulated by the courts, the contours of this paradigm can in 
some broad sense be gleaned from cases such as Magill, Bronner and 
IMS:157 
i) New Product: The refusal to grant access to the facility is likely 
to prevent the emergence of a new product for which there is 
potential consumer demand;  
ii) Essentiality: The facility is ‘indispensable’ to carrying on 
business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute 
for that facility;  
iii) Objective Justification: The refusal is not capable of being 
objectively justified; and 
iv) Secondary market: The refusal is likely to foreclose all 
competition in the secondary market.  
 
Notwithstanding the above factors, an English case held that the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ factors drawn out by the EC courts are not exhaustive but could 
156 Magill (n 71) [46].  
157 IMS clearly reiterates that the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test is here to stay. See B Lebrun 
‘IMS v NDC : Advocate General Tizzano's Opinion’ 26 (2) (2004) EIPR 84.  
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admit of other situations as well in future.158 The UK Court of Appeal observed 
that this approach was warranted by the ‘width of the descriptions of abuse 
contained in Article 82 itself’.159 
Of all the ‘exceptional circumstances’ factors, the one that truly underpins the 
very essence of the essential facilities doctrine is ‘essentiality’ or 
‘indispensability’. Needless to state, if the facility is non-essential, one does not 
need to examine the other limbs of this doctrine.  
 
‘Essentiality’ formed a significant portion of the underlying judicial reasoning in 
Magill160 Bronner and IMS. In Magill, the weekly listings were not reasonably 
and practically replicable – they were very ‘essential’ and no amount of 
innovation could have produced an alternative.161 In Bronner, the ECJ stipulated 
a high threshold for ‘essentiality’, holding that mere inconvenience in duplicating 
the ‘essential facility’ in question would not suffice. In IMS, the Commission 
found that the copyrighted 1860 brick structure had acquired the status of a de 
facto industry standard and that this precluded the creation of viable substitutes 
by  competitors. It is pertinent to note that although Magill and IMS were 
copyright cases and Bronner didn’t even involve an intellectual property, to the 
extent that they lay down a broad framework for determining ‘indispensability’ 
or ‘essentiality’, their principles could be transposed to patent cases as well.  
 
158 Intel Corp v VIA Technologies Inc  [2002] EWCA Civ 1905. For an analysis of this decision, 
see D Curley ‘Eurodefences and Chips"A Somewhat Indigestible Dish": The UK Court of 
Appeal's Decision in Intel Corp v Via Technologies’ (2003) 25 (6) EIPR 282. See also n 235. 
159 Intel (n 158) [48].  
160 Apart from Bronner, most other cases including Magill do not appear to have treated 
‘essentiality’ seriously enough, at least to the extent of discussing this limb first before moving 
on to the other limbs. However as mentioned earlier, although essentiality or indispensability 
was not explicitly stated as a separate factor in Magill, it was clearly part of the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ equation and an important prerequisite on which the finding of abuse was based. 
161 In fact, in this case, even attempting an alternative would have been illogicalas a 
compilation of television listings would always require the listings to be reproduced.  
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1 Assessing ‘Essentiality’: Legal, Technical and Economic Viability 
 
Bronner was the first case to elucidate a broad framework for assessing the 
essentiality or indispensability of a facility. The Bronner framework has already 
been crystallised as propositions at an earlier point in this chapter.162 Amongst 
these propositions, the critical one and perhaps the most difficult to assess is 
the existence of ‘legal, technical or economic obstacles’ that would render the 
creation of an alternative facility an ‘impossible’ or ‘extremely difficult’ task. 
Quite clearly, all the three parameters (legal, technical and economic) have to 
be assessed in order to make a final determination of the essentiality or 
indispensability of a facility. For the sake of generating an easy to use and a 
somewhat ‘mathematical’ framework, I have, while attempting to retain the 
essence of the Bronner framework, adapted it in two significant ways: 
 
i) I have adapted the proposition that ‘the creation of the facility must 
be impossible or extremely difficult owing to legal, technical or 
economic obstacles’ to the proposition that ‘the alternative facility 
should be non viablefrom a legal, technical and economic 
standpoint’. It would appear that ‘viability’ most closely represents 
what the ECJ had in mind while discussing the ‘impossibility’ or 
‘extreme difficulty’ in creating alternatives.  
 
ii) Neither Bronner nor any of the other cases have laid down any 
specific order for assessing the viability of an alternative or substitute. 
This paper therefore proposes the following order: 
a) Determining the legal viability of an alternative facility. 
b) Assuming the alternative is legally viable, evaluating the technical 
viability.  
162 Text after n 134.  
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c) If from a technical standpoint, the alternative is viable, then 
assessing the economic viability of the alternative. 
 
(a) Legal Viability 
 
The above order has some advantages. For one, assessing what constitutes a 
‘legal’ obstacle would be a relatively easier and more objective task for a 
competition authority or a judge, than assessing what constitutes ‘technical’ or 
‘economic’ obstacles. Illustratively, in Magill, the ‘legal viability’ assessment was 
fairly straightforward. Any alternative facility would have ‘infringed’ the 
broadcasters’ copyright, as such facility would have had to replicate the 
television listings. The ‘legal’ obstacle therefore was one that was impossible to 
transcend. 
 
Having said this, it is important to note that Magill was an exception and that 
not every case pertaining to intellectual property is likely to present such a 
clear-cut analysis of ‘legal viability’. In fact, a good number of ‘essential facilities’ 
(protected by intellectual property) would admit of some amount of ‘inventing 
around’ or ‘designing around’.  
 
Estimating the exact latitude that exists for such designing around is a complex 
task we are offered a glimpse of this complexity in IMS. The Commission had 
initially based its interim order (mandating access to the 1860 brick structure), 
in part, on a ruling by a German lower court that had upheld IMS’s copyright 
over its brick structure and found competing structures to be infringing.163 The 
Commission concluded from this that alternatives to the 1860 brick structure 
were not ‘legally viable’.  
 
163 See n 138. 
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However at a later point in time, an appellate court in Germany qualified the 
findings of the lower court in relation to the scope of copyright over the 1860 
structure and seemed to suggest that some of the competing structures would 
not infringe.164 In pertinent part, it held that: 
 
[T]he defendant or third parties could not simply be prohibited 
from developing freely and independently a brick structure that is 
similarly based on a breakdown by district, urban district and post-
code district and for that reason comprise more or less the same 
number of bricks… .‘165 
This finding by the appellate court, along with other factors convinced the 
Commission to withdraw its interim order.166 One way of resolving such 
complexities could be by relegating all borderline cases to the category of 
‘legally’ non-viableas any substitute would be ‘legally uncertain’.  In fact, 
the Commission in IMS adopted such an approach: 
 
…the Frankfurt Court judgement of 28 December 2000 gave an 
injunction preventing the selling of data in both the 2847 and 1860 
segments and any other number of segments so far as it 
constitutes a derivative from RPM 1860. The Court did not define 
precisely what it would consider to be derivatives, and no 
clarification is likely for around 3 years. Pharmaceutical companies 
are aware of this uncertainty, having been warned by IMS not to 
infringe its copyright, and would be skeptical about the legality of 
164 See IMS II (n 138).  
165 Translated version of the judgment. See IMS II (n 138) [10].  
166 See n 138. 
66
any new structure which competitors of IMS might use to format a 
new regional sales data service.167 
Having said this, there is still a significant amount of objectivity associated with 
assessing ‘legal viability’. A non-viable alternative could simply be taken to be 
any alternative that infringes the intellectual property covering the essential 
facility in question or one that violates some other law.168 
(b) Economic Viability 
 
Contrast ‘legal viability’ with ‘economic viability’, where it is more difficult to 
agree upon the objective parameters for determining as to when something is 
‘economically viable’. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) defines ‘economic 
viability’ thus:  
 
The assessment that increases in output produced by a project 
using the least cost method will recover costs, provide an additional 
required rate of return, and sustain effective production in the face 
of uncertainty and risk.169 
This begs the question however of what an ‘additional required rate of return’ 
would be and what the term ‘effective production’ would entail.  
 
Another definition is attempted by DN Marvis et al: ‘the measure of a systems 
ability to achieve specified cost and profitability goals as well as satisfy any 
167 IMS I (n 68) [143]. 
168 Legal ‘non-viability’ could also stem from the potential to transgress some other law. As 
shown earlier, in IMS, one of the legal obstacles hampering the creation of viable alternative 
facilities were limitations stemming from data protection law. See n 136 and 146. 
169 Guidelines for the Economic Analysis of Projects (Asian Development Bank 1997) 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Eco_Analysis/glossary.asp> (20 December 2004). 
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constraints imposed’.170 Here again, one is forced to query as to what the 
‘specified cost and profitability goals’ would be? 
As seen from the above, ‘economic viability’ may not be as objectively 
determinable as ‘legal viability’ or even ‘technical viability’.171 Therefore, this part 
of the evaluation is best relegated to the end.  
 
(c) Technical Viability 
 
The ease or difficulty of evaluating ‘technical viability’ lies somewhere in the 
middle. In an article analyzing the viability of proposals pertaining to water 
resources development, ‘technical viability’ was measured with respect to the 
physical parameters such as quantity, quality and reliability of source of the 
water. 172 
In the context of patented genes, the technical viability of a substitute could in 
accordance with the above physical parameters be measured by asking the 
following question: Will it (the substitute) be as effective in its function as the 
patented gene?  
 
It is evident that in the particular context of genetics, which is a relatively 
nascent and uncertain science,173 asking whether an alternative is technically 
feasible (i.e. can it guarantee the same result) is not an easy task. However, 
when compared with economic feasibility, it is far more objectiveas the basic 
170 DN Mavris, GC Mantis and MR Kirby ‘Demonstration of a Probabilistic Technique for the 
Determination of Aircraft Economic Viability’ 
<http://www.asdl.gatech.edu/publications/pdf/1997/AIAA-97-5585.pdf> (2 January 2005).   
171 It needs to be mentioned here that although ‘economic viability’ is not the exact term used in 
Bronner, it is clear that this term echoes most closely what the ECJ had in mind. 
172 AT Wolf & M Murakami ‘Techno-Political Decision Making for Water Resources Development: 
The Jordan River Watershed’ (1995) 11(2) Water Resources Development 147, 151. 
173 See n 23.  
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question can be reduced to: given the current state of technology, is an 
alternative technically ‘possible’ or not?  
 
It needs to be noted at this juncture that questions of technical feasibility would, 
by their very nature, invite issues of economic feasibility, with which they are 
inexorably linked. However for the purpose of our analysis here, it helps to keep 
them separate. 
 
To conclude the above discussion, since it is possible to determine the ‘legal’ 
viability of an alternative with a higher degree of probability than either its 
technical or economic counterparts, it would help to have this as the first 
parameter against which to assess essentiality. Similarly, since ‘economic 
viability’ would involve consideration of factors that are less definite than those 
pertaining to a legal or technical viability analysis, this assessment could 
perhaps be undertaken last. 
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CHAPTER V 
HOW ‘ESSENTIAL’ IS A PATENTED GENE? 
 
If necessity has been regarded through the ages as the mother of 
‘invention’174 then patent law ought to be considered the mother of ‘inventing 
around’.  
 
As has been stressed in the earlier chapter, the question of ‘essentiality’ or 
‘indispensability’, in the context of intellectual property would, in large part, 
hinge upon the availability of substitutes that could be arrived at by ‘inventing 
around’.  
 
A ALTERNATIVES/SUBSTITUTES TO PATENTED GENES 
 
A number of scholars have argued that a patented gene cannot be invented 
around and that there are no substitutes or alternatives to patented genes. 
Thus, for example, Dr Matthijs of the Center for Human Genetics in Leuven, 
Belgium states:   
 
One reason why the market system does not always operate 
properly in the case of patents on genes is because genes and 
genetic sequences are different from classical chemical compounds. 
Genes and genetic sequences have an informational content. One 
cannot "invent around" the sequence if it is patented, because each 
174 ‘…and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.’ Plato The 
Republic Translated by Benjamin Jowett <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.3.ii.html> (23 
December 2004). 
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gene and each gene sequence is unique in its kind. Hence, through 
patenting, a "double" monopoly arises.175 
Similarly, Professor Lori Andrews states: 
Moreover, there are fewer downsides to granting a patent on a drug 
or a medical device than granting a patent on a gene. Other 
researchers can create alternatives to drugs and devices. There are 
no alternatives to the patented human genes in genetic diagnosis 
and gene therapy.176 
My attempt is to cast some doubt on this proposition, at least in so far as it is 
stated in absolute terms. No doubt, inventing around a ‘patented gene’ may be 
considerably more difficult when compared to other patented inventions. 
However, it is not an ‘impossible’ task, as illustrated by some of the examples 
below: 
1 Gene Variants/Animal Genes  
A patent on a gene could be circumvented by deploying a variant of the gene.177 
In fact, since some animal genes are similar in structure and function to human 
genes, it may even be theoretically possible to substitute an animal gene for a 
human one. A recent BBC report stated that scientists discovered a gene in the 
nematode worm that was similar to the human breast and ovarian cancer gene 
175 G Matthijs ‘Patenting Genes May Slow Down Innovation and Delay Availability of Cheaper 
Genetic Tests’ (2004) 329 British Medical J 1358, 1359. See also G Matthijs and D Halley 
‘European-wide Opposition against the Breast Cancer Gene Patents’  (2002) 10 Eur J Human 
Genetics 783. 
176 LB Andrews (n 55) 78-79. See also LB Westin (n 12 and 24). 
177 I am using the term ‘variant’ in a wide sense to mean any variant of the original sequence 
that could perform broadly the same function, whether it belongs to the same family as the 
original gene (homologous) or not. 
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BRCA1.178 Experts opined that this gene could offer some clues regarding the 
development of breast and ovarian cancer. Given Myriad’s high licensing fees 
and threat to enforce patents strictly even against universities,179 researchers 
keen on working in this area could consider using the nematode gene instead. 
Surprisingly, a similar hypothetical argument seems to have been put forth in a 
recent article, albeit using the Chimpanzee as an example.180 
However this is not to say that all such substitutes would be ‘viable’. 
Illustratively, they may not work as well as the patented human gene and may 
therefore fall short of the ‘technical viability’ threshold. Further, depending on 
the breadth of the patent claims, some substitutes could fall within the scope of 
the original patent and consequently fail the ‘legal viability’ test. This 
assessment will however be undertaken in more elaborate detail later in this 
chapter.  
 
2 Gene Switching/Gene Activation 
 
In order to appreciate the ingenuity underlying this method, one has to journey 
back in time to recollect that the initial grant of gene patents (and indeed even 
the current ones) was based substantially on a legal sophistry.181 Although the 
‘gene’ itself (as existing in its natural state) could not be patented, once it was 
178 ‘Primitive Worm Gives Cancer Clue’: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3368685.stm> (19 
September 2004).  
179 S Bunk ‘Researchers Feel Threatened by Disease Gene Patents’ (1999) 13 (20) The Scientist 
7. 
180 ‘Say you were able to get a gene from a chimpanzee that was close enough to the human 
BRAC-1 gene to do as good a job at predicting the risk for breast cancer. If the owner of the 
patent on the use of the human gene screams foul, you can reply that you are using something 
found in nature, which the Supreme Court has held the patent law cannot rule out’. See ‘Having 
a patent may not protect you’ Red Herring <http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=4341#> 
(24 September 2004). 
181 For a good critique of this sophistry, see JM Conley and R Makowski ‘Back to the Future: 
Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents’ 
<http://www.unclaw.com/chin/teaching/patent/S2004/productof%20nature.pdf> (12 November 
2004). 
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isolated or purified in some form, a magic wand swept it past the ‘product of 
nature’ hurdle.182 Patents were thus issued on ‘isolated and purified’ DNA 
sequences (separate from the chromosomes in which they occurred in nature) 
and on DNA sequences that had been spliced into recombinant vectors or 
introduced into recombinant cells (of a sort that did not exist in nature). 
A patent monopoly therefore would cover only such artificial embodiment of the 
genetic information and not the ‘genetic information’ per se. It is this 
understanding that could offer significant possibilities for ‘inventing around’ a 
patented gene. In other words, the very same sophistry used to grant gene 
patents could now be flipped on its head. If the ‘gene’ in its natural state (or 
‘genetic information’ per se) cannot be the subject matter of a patent, then 
surely, turning on a human gene to make a protein while the DNA is still lodged 
inside the body (or in the nucleus of a human cell in a laboratory dish) would 
allow someone to work around a patented gene.  
 
This technique popularly referred to as ‘gene switching’ or ‘gene activation’183 is 
coming to be strategically used by companies to design around existing gene 
patents. Thus for example, Sangamo BioSciences, a California based company 
designs around gene patents with the help of certain ‘zinc finger protein’ 
transcription factorsproteins that turn genes on and off. In order to steer clear 
of the patent covering the protein itself (since most patents cover not only the 
gene but also the protein made by the gene), these ‘zinc finger’ switches have 
been designed in a way that they could be directly administered to a patient. 
The zinc finger turns on a gene to express the medically important protein inside 
182 See RS Eisenberg ‘Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA 
Sequences’ (2000) 49 Emory LJ 783, 786. 
183 The scientific term for this technique is ‘endogenous gene activation’. See G Stix ‘Legal 
Circumvention: Molecular Switches Provide a Route around Existing Gene Patents’ (2002) 287 
(1) Scientific American 36. 
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the body, circumventing the need for purifying the protein or removing it from 
the cell.  
 
(a) Amgen v TKT 
A more familiar example of ‘gene activation’ to patent lawyers and scholars 
would be the creative deployment of such ‘switching’ technique by TKT to 
circumvent Amgen’s patents on erythropoietin (hereafter ‘EPO’) and its 
corresponding gene, spawning a series of law suits on both sides of the 
Atlantic.184 EPO is a very important hormone made in the kidney that stimulates 
the production of erythrocytes (red blood cells) in the bone marrow. It therefore 
has tremendous utility in the treatment of anaemia, particularly when such 
anaemia is associated with kidney failure. Unfortunately, the body produces EPO 
in very small amounts, making it inconceivable to isolate enough natural EPO to 
treat all anaemic patients.  
 
This is where Amgen’s deployment of recombinant DNA (r-DNA) technology for 
the production of large quantities of human EPO proves immensely useful.185 
Amgen’s patented method involves isolating the human EPO gene, introducing it 
into a cloning vector and then inserting such vector into a host cell (in this case, 
Chinese Hamster Ovary (CHO) cells) to produce desired amounts of EPO. As will 
be appreciated, the human EPO DNA in this case is ‘exogenous’ to the hamster 
184 This legal saga began with the filing of a declaratory judgment action by Kirin-Amgen Inc 
(hereafter ‘Amgen’) against Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc and Transkaryotic Therapies (hereafter 
collectively ‘TKT’) in the US alleging that TKT’s EPO product infringed Amgen's patents. There 
were proceedings in other jurisdictions as well including the UK, Australia and the Netherlands. 
185 ‘r-DNA technology’ or Recombinant DNA technology allows the production of proteins in large 
quantities by a process that is more efficient and less costly than techniques previously used.  
This is accomplished by (1) isolating DNA containing a particular gene and inserting it into a 
cloning vector to make a recombinant DNA molecule and (2) inserting the vector into an 
appropriate host environment to allow propagation of the recombinant DNA, and if desired, 
expression of the protein product. See Basheer (n 19) 5. 
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host cell. Amgen holds patents not only on this process for producing EPO but 
also on the EPO gene and the end EPO product.186 
By contrast, TKT, in producing its human EPO does not use a ‘host cell’ from a 
non-human species. Rather, it manipulates the ordinarily unexpressed human 
EPO gene in a human cell by introducing a ‘promoter sequence’, which then 
‘switches on’ the EPO coding gene.187 It needs to be noted that although the 
EPO gene is present in all human cells, in most cells it is ‘dormant’ or turned off.  
 
In this sense, as opposed to Amgen’s process which relies upon introducing an 
‘exogenous’ DNA sequence into a host cell, TKT employs an exogenous 
promoter to spur the production of EPO from the ‘endogenous’ EPO gene. While 
this key distinction was appreciated in the UK, it failed to convince courts in the 
US, where TKT was held to infringe. This legal saga will be elaborated upon 
later in this chapter to demonstrate that even such ingenious switching 
techniques may not be free of legal risk. 
 
3 Offshore Research 
 
Another strategy that is coming to be increasingly used in the biopharmaceutical 
industry today is to conduct research involving patented products/processes in 
offshore jurisdictions where the patentee has failed to procure a patent 
registration. This strategy received a boost in the United States with the recent 
186 Amgen's EPO product (marketed under the name Epogen) was launched in 1989. Since that 
time, the product has become a huge success, earning billions of dollars in sales. See Epogen 
Backgrounder <http://www.amgen.com/product/epogen/epogenBackgrounder> (10 September 
2004).   
187 See Kirin-Amgen Inc v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc (No 2) [2004] UKHL 46; (2004) 148 SJLB 
1249 (HL) [10] (hereafter ‘Amgen (HL)’).  TKT sought to market its product under the name 
Dynepo. This product is also referred to as HMR 4396 and Gene-Activated EPO (‘GA-EPO’). For 
the sake of convenience, it will be referred to hereafter as ‘GA-EPO’. 
75
ruling by the US CFAC in Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals188 (hereafter 
‘Housey’) that stated that if the result of using a patented process is 
‘information’ and not a ‘product’, then importing such information into the US 
would not amount to a patent infringement.  
 
(a) Bayer: US Ruling 
 
Housey owned a number of US patents relating to methods of screening for, or 
identifying compounds with stimulatory or inhibitory activity against certain 
proteinsthese compounds consequently had the potential for development as 
pharmaceuticals. Bayer employed the screening method in Europe to identify 
compounds which were then developed as the active ingredient of certain 
pharmaceutical compositions. Bayer proceeded to import into and sell in the 
United States these pharmaceutical compositions. Housey brought proceedings 
against Bayer for infringement of its US patents under section 271(g).189 This 
section reads in relevant part as:  
 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to 
sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made 
by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an 
infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product 
occurs during the term of such process patent.’  
 
Upholding the dismissal of Housey’s complaint by the District Court, the Court of 
Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) rejected Housey’s argument that 
information obtained using its patented process was a ‘product’ within the 
meaning of the statute. The court clarified that infringement under section 
188 Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals Inc 340 F 3d 1367 (Fed Cir 2003), affirming the decision 
of the District Court in 169 F Supp 2d 328 (Del 2001). 
189 Section 271(g) (1) of 35 USC 1994 (US). 
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271(g) is limited to physically manufactured goods, and declined to extend the 
protection of the statute to information generated by a patented process.190 
Similarly, the court rejected Housey’s assertion that a drug discovered by using 
‘information’ derived from a patented process was a ‘product of that process’. 
The court held that section 271 (g) required that ‘the process must be used 
directly in the manufacture of the product, and not merely as a predicate 
process to identify the product to be manufactured’.191 It therefore concluded 
that ‘a drug product, the characteristics of which were studied using the claimed 
research processes’ was ‘not a product "made by" those claimed processes.’192 
Under Bayer therefore, a patentee cannot exclude importation of either 
‘information’ or products not ‘directly’ obtained from the patented process. 
Although the imported information in the case of Housey was the biological 
activity of a drug molecule, the decision would seem to apply equally to the 
importation of other types of information, such as DNA sequence information. 
 
To illustrate this point, consider the example of Synergene, a Maltese company 
that had been, till recently, conducting diagnostic tests using Myriad’s patented 
BRCA genes and shipping the results (‘information’) back to customers in 
countries where the patent existed.193 Needless to say, this was possible owing 
to the fact that Myriad’s inventions were not patented in Malta.  
 
Similarly, NimbleGen, a US company is reported to be strategically using the 
patented processes of Affymatrix to produces custom microarrays from a facility 
190 Bayer (n 188) 1376-77. 
191 ibid 1378. 
192 id. 
193 E Check ‘Malta Provides Loophole for Breast-Cancer Screen’ (2002) 419 Nature 767. 
Unfortunately, this testing was discontinued by Synergene, owing to what appears to be 
economic constraints. See n 233. 
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in Iceland.194 Since Affymatrix failed to patent its technology in Iceland, 
NimbleGen conducts its research unhindered in this jurisdiction and then ships 
the resulting data (‘information’) back to customers in countries where the 
technology in question is patent protected. Not too surprisingly, Affymetrix took 
a keen interest in the Housey case and filed an amicus brief, arguing that patent 
law did not differentiate between ‘physical products’ and ‘information 
products’.195 
Having said the above, it is important to bear in mind that this strategy may not 
work indefinitely as companies could opt to patent worldwide, particularly in 
those countries where technological and infrastructural capabilities enhance 
attractiveness as an offshore research destination. The laws could also be 
amended to bring such strategic offshoring within the ambit of patent 
infringement.   
 
(b) Bayer: UK/EU Position 
 
In much the same way as section 271 of the US Patents Act referred to above, 
Section 60(1)(c) of the UK Patents Act states that it is an infringement of a 
patented process to sell, use or import into the United Kingdom a product which 
is the ‘direct’ result of a patented process. The section reads as below: 
 
… a person infringes a patent for an invention if ... where the 
invention is a process, he disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses 
or imports any product obtained directly by means of that process 
or keeps any such product whether for disposal or otherwise.  
194 See M Salisbury ‘Is Data a Product? Patent Kings Fear IP Goes Outside the Law’  Genome 
Technology <http://www.genomeweb.com/articles/view.asp?Article=20042316229> (24 
September 2004). 
195 id.     
78
Although the UK has not seen a Housey-like casewhere the court was called 
upon to rule whether a ‘product’ as used in section 60 includes ‘information’, 
there have been cases dealing with the causal link between the use of the 
patented process and the imported product. The leading case in this regard is 
Pioneer Electronics Capital Inc. v Warner Music Manufacturing Europe GmbH, 
discussed below.196 
Pioneer held a patent in the UK for processes relating to the manufacture of 
master disks, which were used for the mass production of compact disks (CDs). 
However, the patent covered the process of producing master disks but not the 
process of producing CDs from the master disks. Pioneer sued Warner for 
importing CDs into the United Kingdom which had been made outside the 
United Kingdom from the master disks. Pioneer argued that the CDs were 
products obtained ‘directly’ from the patented process.  
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision that the finished CDs were 
the result of three further stages of production and were therefore materially 
different from the master disks. They further noted that neither the master nor 
any of the intermediate products were capable of performing the same function 
as the finished disk.197 
It would be fair to state that this decision is broadly reflective of the European 
position as well.198 In fact, in reaching its decision, the court held that by virtue 
196 [1997] RPC 757 (CA). 
197 ibid 764-65. 
198 When I use the term ‘European position’, I am very generally referring to the principles laid 
down in European patent instruments such as the EPC and the CPC. Despite the fact that the 
EPC does not govern the extent of protection and enforcement of European patents in 
designated countries, it would appear that today there is a growing trend towards consistency 
across national courtsas national courts are looking more to the European Patent Office (EPO) 
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of section 130(7) of the Act, section 60(1)(c) had to be construed in line with 
the EPC. Article 64(2) of the EPC states that:  
 
If the subject-matter of the European patent is a process, the 
protection conferred by the patent shall extend to the products 
directly obtained by such process.  
 
Since Article 64(2) has its origins in German law, the court turned to the 
German Patent Act and found that the German equivalent for the term ‘directly’ 
was unmittelbar199a term similar to ‘without intermediary’. The court therefore 
held that the section applied to products which were the direct and immediate 
result of the patented process.  
 
It would be interesting to hypothesise how a UK court would decide a Housey 
like case, particuarly the ‘information’ versus ‘product’ dilemma that the US 
decision sought to address. Since the wording of the statutory sections are 
broadly similar, it is reasonable to assume that ‘information’ derived from the 
patented process would not constitute a ‘product’ for the purposes of section 
60(1)(c). On the issue of whether a drug discovered by using that information 
would amount to a ‘product’ under section 60 (1) (c), Pioneer would resolve this 
issue in favour of Bayer. Much like the US decision, it is likely to be held that the 
direct output of the process is information about the chemical compound  and  
not the chemical compound itself.  
 
B THE ‘VIABILITY’ ISSUE 
 
and decisions of other member states when determining question of infringement. See G Triton 
Intellectual Property in Europe (Sweet and Maxwell London 1996) 55.  
199 Section 6(2) of the German Patents Act. See Pioneer (n 196) 765-66. 
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I have briefly tried to highlight above some of the ways in which gene patents 
could be circumvented by the deployment of substitutes/alternatives. However, 
it remains to be seen whether such substitutes or alternatives would be 
‘viable’technically, legally and economically. I will use the Bronner framework 
to aid me in this investigation. As suggested in chapter IV, it may be helpful to 
do the investigation in this order: 
 
i) Determining the legal viability of the proposed substitute/alternative; 
ii) Assuming the alternative is legally viable, evaluating the technical 
viability;200 
iii) If from a technical standpoint, the alternative is viable, then assessing 
the economic viability of the alternative. 
 
1 Legal Viability 
 
Where the ‘essential facility’ in question is a patented invention, the key 
question to be asked when determining ‘viability’ is: Is the scope of the patent 
broad enough to cover the proposed substitute or alternative? This is not to say 
that this question is determinative of the issue in its entiretyother questions 
such as whether there exists a research exemption and whether such exemption 
is broad enough (to permit working with the patented gene in question to arrive 
at the substitute) also need to be asked. First, we discuss patent scope before 
moving on to the research exemption. 
 
(a) Determining Patent Scope 
 
200 Since the circumvention strategy based on taking research offshore is one that primarily 
relies on a perceived gap in the law (and such ‘gap’ has already been discussed), it will not be 
discussed again under the ‘legal viability’ section. 
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Patent claims determine the scope of the monopoly conferred by a patent, but 
some latitude is permitted in construing them. The extent of such latitude 
depends on the legal system under consideration. Illustratively, while the US 
recognizes a doctrine (‘doctrine of equivalents’) that enables protection to 
‘equivalents’ beyond the literal scope of the claims,201 the UK does not.  
 
In the UK, claim scope is determined in accordance with the doctrine of 
‘purposive construction’, well articulated for the first time in the famous Catnic 
decision202 and reflected today in Article 69 of the EPC203 and the corresponding 
Protocol.204 In short, this approach entails the following: 
 
i) In construing a patent claim, as opposed to a strict literal 
interpretation, emphasis must be placed upon what the skilled person 
would have understood a patentee to mean by the language of the 
claims. 
ii) The issue of ‘infringement’ is a fairly straightforward assessment of 
whether the infringing product or process falls within the ‘claim’ 
scope, thus so purposively ‘construed’.  
 
201 As per this doctrine ‘a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express 
terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is "equivalence" between 
the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented 
invention’. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co 339 US 605, 70 S Ct 854 (1950). 
See also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 520 US 17, 117 S Ct 1040 (1997) 
and more recently Festo Corporation V Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co Ltd  535 US 722,  
122 S Ct 1831 (2002). The effect of the doctrine is to extend protection to equivalents outside 
the claims which perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain 
substantially the same result. See Amgen (HL) (n 187) [38]. 
202 Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183, 243. 
203 In Amgen (HL) (n 187) [48], Lord Hoffman categorically stated that the Catnic principle was 
precisely in accordance with Article 69 and the protocol. He also noted that ‘…since Catnic, the 
UK has had Article 69 which, firmly shuts the door on any doctrine which extends protection 
outside the claims.’ ibid [44].  
204 Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the Convention, adopted at the Munich 
Diplomatic Conference for the setting up of a European System for the Grant of Patents on 
5 October 1973 (hereafter ‘Protocol’) 
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The hostility of English courts towards the ‘doctrine of equivalents’ was most 
recently witnessed in Amgen205 when Lord Hoffman expressed his anguish at 
this doctrine, owing to which ‘American patent litigants pay dearly for results 
which are no more just or predictable than could be achieved by simply reading 
the claims.’206 
Amgen articulates the UK position on the scope of patent claims in a succinct 
manner and is therefore a good starting point for a discussion in this regard. As 
noted earlier,207 Amgen, a California pharmaceutical company which held a 
patent on recombinant EPO for the treatment of anaemia, sued TKT for its 
gene-activated Erythropoietin product, GA-EPO. While in the UK, the legal 
outcome favoured TKT, the reverse situation prevailed in the US.208 I first 
consider the UK ruling before moving on to the US one.209  
(i) Amgen: UK position 
 
The House of Lords upheld the unanimous Court of Appeal decision that TKT's 
gene-activated erythropoietin (GA-EPO) product does not infringe Amgen’s 
patent.210 However it overruled the Court of Appeal on validity and held that two 
of the main claims were invalid. While the House of Lord’s decision covers many 
interesting issues, including product-by-process claims, insufficiency, anticipation 
205 Amgen (HL) (n 187). 
206 ibid [44]. Lord Hoffman delivered the judgment, with which all the other Law Lords 
concurred.  
207 See text after n 184. 
208 It is to be noted that the US ruling is not a final one and could be subject to further appeals.   
209 As with the rest of the paper, the focus will be on the UK positionhowever in order to 
appreciate this position, it is important that it be contrasted with the US position.  
210 Amgen (HL) (n 187). On 31 July 2002, the UK Court of Appeal, reversing the earlier decision 
of the Patents Court, ruled that the contentious claims were valid (claims 19 and 26), but that 
TKT does not infringe. See Kirin-Amgen Inc v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc (No 2) [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1096; [2003] RPC 3 (CA), which reversed in part the lower court decision in Kirin-Amgen Inc 
v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc (No 2) [2002] RPC 2 (Ch D (Patents Ct)). 
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and ‘purposive construction’, I will, for the purpose of our discussion here focus 
on the issue of ‘purposive construction’.  
 
The main issue was whether TKT’s method of manufacturing EPO fell outside 
the claims of Amgen’s patent. Lord Hoffman considered in detail the rules of 
construction appropriate to such a situation before proceeding to apply them to 
the facts.  He emphasised that: 
 
[T]he determination of the extent of protection conferred by a 
European patent is an examination in which there is only one 
compulsory question, namely that set by Article 69 and its Protocol: 
what would a person skilled in the art have understood the patentee 
to have used the language of the claim to mean?211 
In an interesting twist, Lord Hoffman also warned that the three questions 
(‘Protocol questions’) which he himself had set out in Improver v Remington212 
for determining scope were ‘only guidelines’ and were ‘more useful in some 
cases than in others.’213 
211 Amgen (HL) (n 187) [69].  
212 Improver Corpn v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [1990] FSR 181, 189. Since Improver,
the Protocol Questions had been widely applied by the English Courts in order to determine 
whether equivalents fall within the scope of the claims and have become definitive of the 
approach of the English courts to the interpretation issue. In short, the questions were:  
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If yes, the variant 
is outside the claim. If no:  
(2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious at the date of the 
publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art? If no, the variant is outside the claim. If 
yes:  
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the language of the 
claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning was an 
essential requirement of the invention? If yes, the variant is outside the claim. 
213 Amgen (HL) (n 187) [52]. 
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After laying down these rules of construction, Lord Hoffman moved on to apply 
them to the facts. Of the 31 claims in the patent,214 only three were treated as 
relevant. These claims (1, 19 and 26) are briefly summarized as under:   
 
i) Claim 1: A DNA sequence for use in securing the expression of EPO in 
a host cell, such sequence selected from tables in the patent or 
related sequences; 
ii) Claim 19: EPO which is the product of the expression of an exogenous 
DNA sequence, and which has a higher molecular weight by the ‘SDS-
PAGE’ testing method than existing EPO derived from extraction from 
urine; and 
iii) Claim 26: EPO which is the product of the expression in a host cell of 
a DNA sequence according to claim 1.  
It must be noted at this juncture that the issue of infringement of the DNA 
sequence itself (claim 1) never arose directly as the alleged infringement was by 
importation of the EPO productthe subject matter of claims 19 and 26. 
However it did arise indirectly, since claim 26 referred back to claim 1.  
The key issue in determining the scope of the patent was the construction of the 
term ‘host cell’ as used in claim 26 (and claim 1).215 In order to resolve this 
issue, it is important to appreciate the difference underlying the two 
technologies. While Amgen’s process for the manufacture of EPO relied on an 
exogenous DNA sequence coding for EPO (which was introduced into the host 
cell), the TKT method involved gene activation of an endogenous DNA sequence 
by an exogenous upstream control sequence.216 
214 European Patent No 0148605B2. Amgen (HL) (n 187) [1]. 
215 Amgen (HL) (n 187) [53]. 
216 See text after n 185. 
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On the evidence, the House of Lords concluded that the skilled person would 
not regard TKT’s process using an endogenous coding sequence to produce GA-
EPO as involving a ‘host cell’, required by claim 1.217 Consequently, TKT’s GA-
EPO was not an EPO falling within claim 26.  
Similarly, the court held that GA-EPO was not ‘the product of … expression of an 
exogenous DNA sequence’ within claim 19, and so there was no infringement 
under this claim as well.218 
Much in line with its principle of construction outlined earlier, the court made it 
abundantly clear that this is where the analysis should end. The claim had been 
construed ‘purposively’, and on the facts there was no infringement. It 
specifically disapproved of any further attempt to apply the Protocol questions 
over and above that construction.219 
217 Amgen (HL) (n 187) [58], [80]. 
218 ibid [58]. 
219 ibid [70].  
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(ii) Amgen: US position 
 
At the outset, it is important to note that the US and UK cases cannot be 
compared directly, as the claims in the patents were not exactly the same. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that they can be so compared, it would appear that 
the US courts did grant a much broader scope to Amgen’s US patent than did 
the UK courts to the corresponding European patent.220 
Illustratively, while the UK courts relied on the ‘endogenous’ versus  ‘exogenous’ 
distinction in concluding that TKT’s ‘endogenous’ process fell outside Amgen’s 
claim scope, the US courts did not want to read in such a limitation into Amgen’s 
claim.221 The Court of Appeal articulated the position thus:222 
Guided by our principles of claim construction, we agree with the 
district court that TKT improperly seeks to import the “exogenous” 
limitation into the claims. The plain meaning of the claims controls 
here, and they plainly are not so limited. The statement that the 
invention is “uniquely characterized” by the expression of exogenous 
220 ‘The patent claims at issue in the US are not directly comparable to those in the European 
patent’. See J Nurton ‘Lords Reject Equivalents Test’ Managing Intellectual Property (MIP) 
<http://www.legalmediagroup.com> (3 December 2004). 
221 The case began brewing in 1997 when a declaratory suit was filed by Amgen against TKT 
and Hoechst Marion Roussel (collectively referred to as TKT). A District Court in Boston ruled 
that three of the main patents of Amgen were valid and infringed by TKT. See Amgen Inc v 
Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc 126 F Supp 2d 69 (Mass 2001) (hereafter ‘Amgen (US I)’). On 
appeal by TKT, the Federal Circuit affirmed a majority of the lower courts findings but vacated 
and remanded a few issues, relating to the validity of two product patents on EPO and the 
validity and infringement of two patents with claims to EPO producing cells and methods for 
producing EPO. See Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc 314 F 3d 1313 (Fed Cir 2003) 
(hereafter ‘Amgen (US II)’). The District Court recently addressed these issues on remand. 
Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc 339 F Supp 2d 202 (Mass 2004) (‘Amgen (US III)’). The 
ultimate result of this decision, coupled with the District Courts’ earlier decisions, is that the four 
Amgen patents at issue have been held valid, enforceable, and infringed by TKT.  
222 Amgen (US II) (n 221) 1326. 
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DNA sequences does not impel us to accept TKT’s position when the 
asserted claims do not contain such an express limitation.  
 
Similarly, despite differences in Amgen’s EPO product and TKT’s GA-EPO, the 
doctrine of equivalents was applied to find in favour of Amgen. Although TKT 
was found to not ‘literally’ infringe the ‘080 patent,223 since TKT’s product 
‘performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way to 
obtain substantially the same result’ as the 166-amino acid EPO, it was found to 
be infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.224 
A broad comparison between the US and UK positions demonstrates that not 
only is the process of assessing legal viability a rather complex one but also that 
the results of such assessment would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 
(b) Research Exemption 
 
As mentioned earlier, apart from determining ‘scope’, a legal viability analysis 
would include investigating other factors such as the scope of the research 
exemption.  
 
Even assuming that an alternative to a patented gene does not fall within the 
scope of the patent, it is still possible that the very process of creating that 
alternative or substitute infringes. This is particularly so in situations where one 
223 In April 1997, when Amgen initially filed against TKT for a declaratory judgment of 
infringement, three patents were at issue, including the ‘080 patent. However in October 1999, 
Amgen amended its complaint to include infringement of two additional patents that were issued 
after the initial complaint. 
224 Amgen (US I) (n 221) 186-87. 
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cannot create the substitute without working ‘with’ the patented gene in 
question.225 
This is where a robust ‘research exemption’ helps. As already mentioned in 
Chapter III, such ‘research exemption’ exists in most patent regimes and is an 
important tool that guarantees a certain amount of flexibility in using the 
patented invention whilst working towards a downstream product. 
Unfortunately, as shown in that chapter, the scope of this exemption is limited, 
particularly in the context of those gene patents that qualify as ‘research tool’ 
patents.226 
2 Technical Viability 
 
After having determined that the alternative or substitute is legally viable, one 
ought to assess its technical viability. As stated in Chapter IV, in the context of 
alternatives to patented genes, the key issue is whether one could expect 
broadly similar results when working with the substitute. The Walsh et al paper 
cited one such concern expressed by a representative from a pharmaceutical 
firm:  
 
Because there is a patent on the human gene, you work with the 
guinea pig gene, but it is not the best approach. That’s very 
frustrating. In a number of cases, we can’t work with this protein or 
this gene and it slows things down.227 
225 Such infringements are however difficult to detect. See Walsh et al (n 7), which stated that 
this non detection formed part of the repertoire of working solutions. See text to n 52. 
226 See text after n 88. 
227 Walsh (n 7) 314. 
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Similarly, although substituting the gene of a nematode worm or a chimpanzee 
for the patented human BRCA gene, (as proposed in Chapter IV) could work for 
researchers trying to define the function of the corresponding protein, they may 
not be of much help in the context of a clinical test that has a direct and 
immediate use for patients.228 
3 Economic Viability 
 
If the alternative in question passes the above two thresholds, it has still to clear 
the ‘economic viability’ hurdleperhaps the most complex one in the context of 
a viability assessment. As stated earlier, ‘economic viability’ would involve 
consideration of factors that are less definite than those pertaining to a legal or 
technical viability analysis.229 
Given the high R&D costs inherent in any biopharmaceutical research, one of 
the more definite factors to take into consideration could be the ‘financial 
viability’ of an alternative.230 Thus for example, President Bush’s decision to 
deny federal funding to human embryonic cell lines created after 9 August 
2001231 limited the ability of researchers to procure finance and thereby to 
invent around WARF’s patents over stem cells.232 
228 Arupa Ganguly (Asst Professor, Dept of Genetics, University of Pennsylvania)  
<ganguly@mail.med.upenn.edu> email (2 January 2004). Dr Ganguly’s lab was one amongst 
the many that had to discontinue diagnostic testing for breast cancer owing to Myriads patents 
covering the breast cancer genes and diagnostic testing methods. See n 40. 
229 Text after n 168. 
230 ‘Economic viability has two aspects: financial, which measures the chances of acquiring 
financing for a project (often, but not always related to the amount of capital required), and 
efficiency’. See Wolf and Murakami (n 172) 151. 
231 On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that federal funding for stem cell 
research would be limited to the then-existing stem cell lines. See n 47. 
232 As noted earlier (n 47), this patent held by Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) 
covering pluripotent embryonic stem cells (and the method for isolating them) were exclusively 
licensed to Geron Corporation for the commercial development of a number of cell types. 
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Similarly, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Synergene, a Maltese company 
that had been circumventing Myriad’s patents by performing breast cancer tests 
in Malta decided to discontinue it on what appears to be ‘economic’ grounds.233 
C COMPLEXITY OF THE ‘ESSENTIALITY’ ANALYSIS 
 
As evident from the above discussion, the process of evaluating ‘essentiality’ is a 
fairly complex process. Indeed, one might even question the ‘viability’ of such 
an assessment. Would a competition authority have the necessary 
expertise/resources to undertake this investigation, in all its complexity?234 
At least, to the extent of determining the scope of an intellectual property right, 
a ruling by an intellectual property authority or court on this issue would help. In 
fact, most cases where the doctrine of essential facilities is invoked also involve 
parallel infringement proceedings before the courts (as was the case with IMS 
and Magill).235 However, as IMS more than amply illustrates, there can be 
problems with such reliance. The Commission’s interim ruling that the facility 
was an ‘essential’ one was based substantially on the ruling by a German court 
that competing brick structures had infringed IMS’s copyright over the 1860 
brick structure. This ruling was later modified by an appellate court, which 
233 ‘BRCA testing is very resource intensive and hence it was decided to dedicate such resources 
to alternative projects.’ Kevin Camilleri (Operations Director, Synergene  Biotechnology Group 
Malta) <kevinc@synergene.net> email (5 November 2004). 
234 Here again, time and space constraints prevent me from reflecting in greater detail on the 
level of complexity involved and how best an authority can simplify this analysis. However, I will 
attempt to extract the key issues that such a discussion would entail.  
235 See also Intel (n 158), a UK patent infringement law suit where the defendant raised Article 
81 and 82 defences (commonly labelled ‘Euro Defences’). A split trial of the patent law and the 
competition law aspects of the case was ordered. The trial judge favoured Intel’s application for 
summary disposal of the Euro Defences on the ground that they had no real prospect of 
success. See A Toutoungi Intel V Via: Holding Back The Tide Of Compulsory Licensing (2002) 24 
(11) EIPR 548. The Court of Appeal however overruled the initial decision and reinstated all of 
Via's Eurodefences. The matter was subsequently settled. 
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restricted the scope of IMS’s copyright and seemed to suggest that some 
alternative brick structures would be non-infringing. Consequently, the 
Commission was forced to withdraw its interim ruling.236 
Should a competition authority therefore necessarily have to wait for a final 
ruling on the scope of intellectual property before applying the essential facilities 
doctrine? This may not be an efficient outcome, particularly in cases where the 
abusive practice in question could have harmed the competitive structure of the 
market considerably in the interim. Also, what of those cases where there is no 
such parallel proceeding before an intellectual property tribunal or court?  
 
There are ways to mitigate this complexity and one such solution is found in the 
Commission’s approach in IMS. As noted earlier, the Commission categorised 
‘substitutes’ to the 1860 brick structure as ‘legally uncertain’237 and therefore 
‘legally non viable’. Without delving extensively into the merits of the copyright 
dispute, the Commission made some assumptions for the purpose of its 
analysis:  
The Commission assumes for the purpose of these proceedings 
and according to German law that the 1860-brick structure is 
covered by a copyright. This legal assessment will not consider 
questions of copyright law either with regard to the specific 
subject matter of the right or the national measures which the 
German court employs to enforce copyright legislation. The 
Commission notes that the Frankfurt Court considered that the 
236 Text after n 163. 
237 ibid. See also IMS I (n 68) [143]-[145].  
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1860 brick structure is a database, and that copyright protection 
for databases is harmonised under Directive 96/9/EC13.238 
Drawing from the IMS experience therefore, one ought not to shy away from 
engaging in a meaningful way with an assessment of essentiality. Rather, some 
complexities could be resolved by relegating borderline cases to the category of 
‘legally’ non-viableas any substitute would be ‘legally uncertain’.  






‘A knot!’ said Alice, always ready to make herself useful, and looking anxiously 
about her. ‘Oh, do let me help to undo it!’ 239 
I began this journey by exploring the doctrine of essential facilities as a potential 
solution to the ‘knotty’ issue of the blocking impasse in the biopharmaceutical 
arena. However in the process, an even knottier issue arosewhether patented 
genes were ‘essential facilities’ in the first place. Without in any way claiming to 
have un-knotted this conundrum (if at all that were possible), I do hope I have 
provided a robust enough framework to determine  ‘essentiality’ on a case-by- 
case basis. No doubt, patented genes are very difficult to invent around
however, as this paper has shown, despite this ‘difficulty’ in ‘inventing around’, 
not all patented genes are absolutely ‘essential’ in the competition law sense. 
 
Paradoxically, the very application of the essential facilities doctrine and an 
assessment of the ‘essentiality’ limb in particular could help determine the 
existence and extent of blocking. Recent empirical studies note that the 
perceived problems of blocking have been mitigated to a large extent by certain 
working solutions adopted by the industry, one of which is the ability to ‘invent 
around’.240 In other words, if the facility is a non-essential one, then there can 
be no ‘blocking’ or ‘restricted access’. However the converse need not always be 
trueif the facility is an essential one, but is widely licensed, it is quite possible 
that there would be no ‘blocking’. Applying the essentiality framework therefore 
239 L Carroll Alice in Wonderland  (Illustrated by Sir John Tenniel)  eBooks@Adelaide (University 
of Adelaide South Australia 2004) 
<http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/c/carroll/lewis/alice/chapter3.html> (2 Jan 2005). 
240 See Walsh et al (n 7), OECD Report (n 8) and Nielsen (n 8).  
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to specific cases of patented genes, one could generate data that could then be 
used to determine the extent of blocking or restricted access. This could in turn 
help decide whether the ‘blocking’ is of such a widespread nature as to warrant 
a substantial legal and/or institutional response.  
 
In this regard, it is pertinent to note that a competition law remedy cannot be a 
panacea to resolve the blocking or restricted access issue for all time to come. 
Rather, if the blocking issue becomes pervasive, it may be more prudent to 
devise a more focussed remedy. However until such time as this issue reaches 
such proportion, the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ holds promise as a robust 
solution. Needless to say, this preliminary conclusion can only be validated after 
one has explored other aspects (limbs) of the doctrine. And with that in mind, it 
is now time to break this journey.
95
